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Abstract

This thesis explores the factors that can explain why some rebel movements attain
territorial autonomy while others do not. This was studied through a cross-regional
comparison of three movements, the Zapatista movement in Mexico, the Kurdish
movement in Turkey and the Polisario Front in Morocco. These cases were chosen with
the aim to present a causal inference of their divergent outcomes, especially that the
three rebel movements primarily sought to achieve some measure of self-determination.
While it was relatively attained by the Zapatista movement through territorial
autonomy, the Kurdish movement has been listed as a terrorist organization and the
Polisario Front is outlawed in Morocco.
Therefore, this thesis’s main aim is to answer the question of why some rebel
movements attain territorial autonomy while others do not? I hypothesize that there are
three factors that might affect the dynamics of the rebel movements and explain this
research question. These are the extent of transnationalism and popular support of the
movement, external intervention, and the level of democracy within the state. I also
propose that these factors exist and interact in a particular sequence and configuration
that result in divergent outcomes.
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Chapter I.
1.1

Introduction

Introduction

There have been a strong and multifaceted international support to the norms of
“Decolonization” and “Self-determination”, and in consequence backing of the
movements seeking it, since World War II (WW2). The immense favorability towards
these movements and towards territorial autonomy was crystallized because they were
increasingly perceived as a solution to various ethnic conflicts. This is the case
especially if the ethnic conflict is among a minority population and in a defined
geographical area. (Fazal, 2018) Likewise, Ted Gurr were one of the scholars who
argued that negotiated territorial autonomy is shown to be an effective conflict
management mechanism for various ethnopolitical wars in Western and Third World
States. (Gurr, 1994) This all may have promoted the rise to some nations’ territorial
autonomy and further to the development of new nation-states.
However, it does not explain the divergent outcomes of why some rebel movements
were able to attain territorial autonomy while others do not and even further be listed
as terrorist organizations or get internationally neglected, condemned, or resisted.
Although they might develop at similar timings or may have used similar strategies as
well. Despite that the debate on these rebel movements’ effectiveness to produce social
or political change is still ongoing, but the focus of the thesis will be on the ability of
some rebel movements to attain territorial autonomy while others do not.
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Thus, I aim to answer the question of why some rebel movements attain territorial
autonomy while others do not? I hypothesize that there are three factors that might
affect the dynamics of the rebel movements and explain this research question. These
are the extent of transnationalism and popular support of the movement, external
intervention, and the level of democracy within the state. I further assume that the
interaction of the three variables in a particular configuration and sequence can explain
the divergent outcomes. In other words, I propose that it is crucial to go beyond the
existing literature that explain the outcomes of the rebel movements through one or
more variables and use an interactive model to seek an accurate causal mechanism. (will
be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2). This will be investigated through three case
studies which are the Zapatista movement in Mexico, the Kurdish movement in Turkey
and the Polisario Front in Morocco.
By analyzing the Zapatista movement in Mexico, the Kurdish movement in Turkey1,
and the Polisario Front2 in Morocco in a comparative perspective, the thesis aims to
establish connections with the globalization literature in general, transnationalism in
specific and international relations discipline to the study of the modern social
movements’ literature. I argue that the Zapatista movement was able to achieve
territorial autonomy, while the Polisario Front and the Kurdish movement could not till
today, despite the similar timings the three movements were established at. The reasons
behind these different outcomes will be discussed in relation to the thesis’s hypotheses

It is a subconscious choice to not refer to it as “PKK”. This is because that the PKK is a political
party and also the armed wing of the Kurdish movement in the Turkey-Kurdish conflict, as the EZLN
is the armed agent of the Zapatista movement in the Zapatista-Mexican conflict, and as the SPLA , (the
Saharawi People's Liberation Army) is the military wing of the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara
conflict. In all, the Kurdish movement encompasses the armed agent of the PKK, the institutional
political parties which are the HDP/DBP and the local assemblies. (O’Connor, 2017)
1

It is the abbreviation of “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro”,
which is a Sahrawi independence movement based in Algeria, was founded in 1973. (Maghraoui, 2010)
2
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outlined earlier which are the movements’ transnationalism & popular support, the level
of democracy within the state and the external intervention.

1.2 Criteria of Case Selection

The three rebel movements were mainly chosen as the thesis’s case studies for various
reasons. I argue that these cross-regional cases show multiple similarities but yielded
different outcomes. In other words, - and as discussed earlier- despite the similarities,
the Zapatista movement was able to attain territorial autonomy while the Kurdish
movement in Turkey, particularly the PKK, got listed as a terrorist organization and the
Polisario Front is now considered a frozen conflict internationally and an illegal body
in the Moroccan territory. Though, these divergent outcomes will be further explained
through the hypotheses outlined, I will try first to discuss the similarities that encompass
the cases.
The three movements are considered peripheral movements which were established
against centralized states seeking some form of self-determination. In other words, the
three movements’ conflicts arose as “from below” mobilization movements and against
three centralized states which are Mexico, Turkey, and Morocco. The three movements
aimed to achieve self-determination from three states, despite that this aim was
changing back and forth in its degree and form. This means that the three rebel
movements at the beginning of their eruption aimed for secession from the three states,
and then this target has changed to territorial autonomy and then back to secession for
some movements. Not only that, but they have also all erupted within the same era of
the 1990s to confront the general context of oppression exercised against them
9

compared to the other groups within their societies or to defend their established panethnic identities. For instance, the Zapatista movement has emerged in 1994 and
primarily fought for the Mayan Peasants in Chiapas, the Kurdish movement in 1978 for
the Kurdish peasants in Turkey and the Polisario Front in 1973 for the Sahrawis in
Western Sahara. Not only that, but they all have used violent strategies at some point
of the movement’s struggle against the state and they all encompass military wings like
the PKK, SPLA & EZLN, in Turkey, Morocco and Mexico, respectively. In other
words. they all have exercised insurgencies and used arms against the state at least at
one phase of the struggle. Moreover, they all have witnessed several peace negotiations
with their states to put an end to the conflict. Also, they all were linked to places, like
Diyarbakir in Turkey, Chiapas in Mexico, and Western Sahara in Morocco. Adding to
this, they all at one point were categorized as national-liberation movements by various
scholars. (Criss 1995, Krovel, 2013 & Daadaoui, 2010)
Despite the above similarities, and the similar timeline of the movements which were
found in the 1990s, they have yielded different outcomes. For instance, the Zapatista
movement was granted territorial autonomy two years after its eruption. On the other
hand, the Kurdish movement and particularly the PKK was listed as a terrorist
organization and the Polisario Front was categorized as a frozen conflict. Moreover, it
is prominent to outline that their legal situation is different as well. For example, the
Western Saharan region -the Polisario front is fighting for-is not legally part of
Morocco’s sovereignty like the other two cases. Also, the PKK -which I refer to as the
military wing of the movement- is in fact a political party with a political wing besides
being a military wing. I refer to the PKK as the military wing because it is the most
active military wing of the Kurdish movement. However, these differences did not
yield much different results like those between the Kurdish movement and the Polisario
10

Front. Thus, the choice of the cases would foster my analysis and understandings to
their trajectories.
Therefore, the choice of these three rebel movements will allow for studying a wider
scope of alternative accounts and elements. Not only that, but will generate patterns that
transcends the regional-bounded arguments that can neither explain the cross-regional
trends nor the intraregional differences. It will assist in explaining the causal
mechanism of my research question and foster my study of better political, institutional,
or structural explanation that can account for the divergent outcomes within the same
regions and the similarities that span across three different regions. In short, these crossregional cases might -as Jason Brownlee argued in “Authoritarianism in the age of
democratization”- have dissimilarities in political-economic, historical factors and
international relations, but will add to the research much richness and realism
(Brownlee, 2007).
Moreover, this choice of cases will also help in testing empirically my assumptions and
hypotheses which suggest going beyond the existing literature that explain the
outcomes of the rebel movements through one or more variables and use an interactive
model to seek an accurate causal mechanism. This is because when I referred to the
literature that examined my research question, I found that none of the displayed
theoretical approaches (the political opportunity structure approach and the type of the
existent political system, the resource mobilization approach, and the strategies used)
were able to demonstrate the divergent outcomes of these cases studies.
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1.3 Literature Review

The literature displayed important aspects which I found it to have a lot of usefulness
either in discussing the research question or analyzing my hypotheses. This section will
be divided into three main parts. The first will focus on briefly discussing “rebel
movements” & “secession”, the movements’ success and failure and the reason of using
“territorial autonomy “as my measure of success, the second will display the probable
reasons for different movements’ outcomes and the third will very briefly shed light on
the rising significance of “territorial autonomy”.
I found huge contention not only over the definition of the movements under discussion
but also over measuring the success of the movements. First, I chose to categorize the
case studies as “rebel movements”. Rebel movements are the movements that seek
autonomous rule to their regional governments either through territorial autonomy or
secession and have engaged in an armed conflict at one or more phases in their
resistance. (more of this in Chapter 2). The rebel movements under the study have
sought at least at one time of their struggle self-determination and secession. This aim
has changed back and forth in its degree and form, but it is crucial to highlight that
territorial autonomy is different to secession. Territorial autonomy is a political status
that guarantees a definite territory the authority to maintain its identity, self-rule and
regulate its own affairs through autonomous legislation, executive body, or
government, administration and in some cases an independent judicial unit as well,
12

without seceding from the nation-state (more of this in Chapter 2). However, secession
is a form of political disintegration. It is when a group of political actors recall their
loyalties and patriotic sentiments from the nation-state to another center of their own.
Thus, the political disintegration can range between demanding different forms of
autonomy like territorial autonomy to secession. (Bartkus, 1999) Meaning, that rebel
movements seeking secession, usually aims to establish an independent nation-state
governed by their own culture, language, or ethnicity. Secession often requires the rebel
movements to seize a particular territory, which can be developed into their new
territorial base. This entails that the rebel movements prioritize their constant control
over their territory of dispute. (Brilmayer,1991) Likewise, James Crawford pinpoints
that secession is the process of establishing a state through the usage of threat or force
and usually without the political acceptance of the former nation-state. (Crawford,
2006) Other scholars tend to articulate that the absence of the nation state’s consent
usually leads to the usage of political violence and the escalation repressive tactics.
(Pavkovic A., 2015) Thus, and according to the literature displayed above, the three
rebel movements under the study at one phase of their struggle sought to secede and
create their own nation-state, by which this goal has changed back and forth between
secession and territorial autonomy.
Despite the literature disputes over rebel movements and other conceptual
terminologies that will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, a limited scope of the
literature tried to articulate how to measure the success of the movement or when to
name a rebel movement as successful and when as a failed one. For instance, Treviso
mentioned that it was suggested by William Gamson that movements should be
perceived as successful when they achieve the national and international recognition
and were offered substantial concessions. Recognition, in general, occurs when the state
13

accepts to sit for the round table, negotiate, recognize, or include the movement.
Therefore, a failed rebel movement is when the movement was unable to achieve any
of this. Not only that, but the movement is neither considered a failure nor a success if
it resulted in either ignoring or repressing. (Treviso, 2006) I think this aspect is very
contentious and scholarly undertheorized. This is because I was not able to find many
scholars pinpointing when to categorize a movement to have achieved “success in
attaining its goals” and when not. Not only that, but several rebel movements were
nationally (in terms of negotiations) and internationally recognized like the Polisario
Front case, but still repressed. Therefore, for the purpose of seeking accuracy in my
thesis, I propose that we need to transcend and move beyond the limited scope of
definition displayed on “successful” and “failed” movements and narrow our focus to
a more measurable criteria such as “territorial autonomy”. I propose that attaining some
measure of autonomy specifically “territorial autonomy” will be my measure of success
to the rebel movements under discussion. Yet, it is important to point out that the
success for one movement might not be success for another. But, for my case studies,
the similarities -displayed earlier -among them allow for such comparison and for using
“territorial autonomy” as the measure of success. Territorial autonomy is again a
problematic concept especially in terms of which perspective it will be measured with.
Therefore, it will also be precisely discussed in Chapter 2, particularly because I would
use it – as argued before- as a measure of success to the movements (like in the Zapatista
case compared to the other two cases),
Further, the literature displayed different theoretical approaches to identify the possible
reasons behind the variation of these movements’ outcomes. For instance, one scope
argued that this can be explained through the political opportunity structure approach.
It argues that the effectiveness of movements falls back to the extent of the opening or
14

the fragility of political systems to mobilizations. In other words, this means that the
existence of open political systems, unstable relationships between parties, varying
electoral results, constant conflicts with the governmental elites, and the system’s desire
to formulate effective policies, yield more favorable results to the movements’
performance. Building on that, Tilly & Tarrow argue in their book Contentious Politics
, that the perquisites of social movements to effectively exist , are in the form of having
a plurality of independent political centers; having an opening political structure that
may allow to some extent new actors, unstable alliances , the availability of external
support base of intellectuals outside the system, the existence of governmental
repression or decisive changes made at the first stages of the mobilization. (Tilly &
Tarrow, 2006) Similarly, McAdam, McCarthy & Zald outline that the open-strong and
open-weak political structures tend to adopt assimilative strategies in dealing with
social movements and their demands. And on the contrary, the closed-strong political
structures are more into forcing radical attitudes over the movements and construct rigid
strategies against their parties. And by open / close, they mean the ability of the
governmental elites to divert political requests and by weak/strong they mean the state’s
ability to initiate public policies. (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald,1997) Moreover, there
is a proposition that having a democratic political system along with the big capacity of
the social movements will most probably yield favorable results for the social
movements. Thus, authoritarian states along with the low-capacity social movements
tend to result into oppression and may break into civil wars. (Caruso, 2015).
Other scholars related the different movements’ outcomes to their effectiveness of
mobilizing resources (the resource mobilization approach). The resource mobilization
approach outlines that movements should be able to mobilize different resources, and
by resources, it is meant money and labor. Resources are the primary element in order
15

to implement any action-based strategy. The essential element is the ability to calculate
the rewards and losses that may result in engaging in the social movement activity.
These all are immensely affected by the structure of the society and the authorities’
actions. (Caruso, 2015)
In addition, other scholars tend to study the variation of movements’ outcomes in terms
of the strategies used. Some believe that violence or the use of coercive means is
counterproductive and diminishes the ability of the movement to establish strong base
of mass support or to achieve their goals. In support of this view, Tezur pinpoints that
Arendt (1970) displays violence as a destructive tool and that it undermines any
accomplishment of political goals. She asserts that, especially with the rise of many
guerrilla movements, violence does not produce power but destroys it. (Tezur, 2015)
On the other hand, Tilly and Tarrow argue in their book Dynamics of Contention that
there are different strategies used by the social movements which range from the nonviolent and peaceful ones to the civil-disobedience and it is mainly as a consequence to
the kind of relationship, the movement has with the government. And it is not
necessarily that violent methods may lead to destructive results. (McAdam, Tarrow and
Tilly, 2010) A large body of scholarship identiﬁes that the existence of patterns of
ethnic exclusion associated with the desire of formation new nation-states (secessionist
movement) as one of the primary causes of the movement using violent strategies rather
than non-violent ones. (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010 & Wasser
&Griffiths, 2018)

A contrary argument is put forth and asserts that non-violent

resistance may be able to generate higher participation rates out of the fewer physical
or moral hinders to that. In agreement with this, it is proposed that by time, the resort
to violence even by secessionist movements has dwindled and that is because the
movements developed the desire to be internationally recognized and join the club of
16

nation-states. The secessionist movements face-in general- a huge challenge of the
ongoing debate between state sovereignty and self-determination norms which in turn
pose a big uncertainty to them of getting legitimacy. Even though the UN charter
explicitly support the self-determination norm -which is in favor of the separatist and
secessionist movements- but this falls short in terms of protecting human rights’ norms.
Therefore, the movements tend to follow the signs sent by the international community
to gain their recognition which is essential. (Mund, 2013)
Another scope of the literature focused on the norm of “territorial autonomy” and its
relation to the movements. It highlighted that “territorial autonomy” and “autonomy”
in general has become a central feature that characterizes the study of the modern social
movements. For instance, S. Bohm et al outline that many scholars like Offe in 1987
has argued that the newly erupted social movements can be distinguished of having
their focus on establishing “non-institutional” politics and autonomous structures away
from the existing bureaucratic frameworks and state bodies. They argue that Scott in
1990 has also displayed that new social movements can be featured to follow the
ideology of “autonomy of struggle”. This means that the movement is more willing to
fight for its set of goals and will not change their demands according to the external
desires. (Bohm et al, 2010)
Despite that, the literature above displayed multiple approaches to answer my research
question, but I argue that the actual answer to the research question is rather complex
and it is more of the interaction of variables and circumstances in a particular
configuration, rather than one theorized reason as outlined above. This is because I
found that none of the three main approaches discussed above was able to solely explain
the divergent outcomes of my case studies. On one hand, the three rebel movements
have utilized violent and non-violent strategies at least at one phase of their struggle.
17

Also, the Zapatista movement acquired the least resources either financially or
militarily compared to the other two movements, but it was the only one that could
attain territorial autonomy. Not only that, but the three states were at the
democratization phase and they all suppressed the rebel movements at least at one stage
of the conflict. Though, it is crucial to point out that the three states are at different
levels of democratization and democracy. Thus, the thesis’s main proposal is that it is
not about an existing and non-existing variable to explain the causal mechanism but
rather about a particular configuration and sequence of variables that interact together
and unfold the different fates of the three rebel movements under discussion.

1.4 Scholarly Works on the Movements

It was of immense importance to understand how rebel movements are studied in the
literature, the features they acquire, and what are the driving forces that can change
their dynamics, as discussed earlier. Now, I intend to illustrate how several scholars
tackled the topic from different perspectives using the case studies under discussion.
However, as far as I read, I have not found in the literature a comparison of the three
rebel movements of all together, but there were several on comparing the Kurdish and
the Zapatista movements.
Cakmak for instance, established a comparison between the Zapatista movement and
the Kurdish movement. He does not only outline the similarities of both movements;
he further assumes that the Kurdish movement will take a similar path to that of the
Zapatista’s. Cakmak predicts that, because -according to him- both movements are
18

leftists or follow in one or another the Marxist ideology even though this was not very
clear in the Kurdish movement case especially at its beginning. Moreover, he adds that
both movements are a consequence to a general context of oppression and exclusion
undergone by the state. He also claims that both sought to alter their violent strategies.
For instance, the Zapatista movement started out as an armed rebellion to grasp
attention and make their objections heard to, but they tend to change this strategy later
to sustain their credibility and plausibility. Similarly, the Kurdish movement has the
PKK as the dominating armed agent as well in their struggle but is leaning to change
its violent strategies. He asserts that both movements were able to alter the attitude of
the elites towards their objections and their demands as subaltern identities. The author,
further, suggests that civil societies play an important role and affect the outcomes of
the movements. He argues that the support of the civil society to the Zapatista
movement has contributed much to attain autonomy, and that the Kurdish movement
will follow the same path. This is especially that, both movements seem to relate
themselves to specific region or lands like in the case of the Zapatista movement, they
relate themselves to the Chiapas and the Kurdish movement, they relate themselves to
East of Turkey and now to Rojava. (Çakmak, 2014)
However, I think that, despite the immense contribution set by Cakmak, his predictions
of the similar outcomes of the Kurdish movement to the Zapatista’s were not met till
today. The Kurdish movement resumed its armed conflict against the Turkish state and
suffers from the lack of different societal national support. (More of this in Chapter
four)
Serhum on the other side compared the cases through the globalization literature and
the ability of movements to maintain a good image in the international arena. He
compares the extent at each movement has used arms, and the duration it has used
19

political violence and discusses each movement’s internal structure. Serhum explains
that globalization creates a contested zone for the different actors who look up for
resetting the rules of the game between the hegemonic and anti- hegemonic players. He
differentiates between the two movements by demonstrating how the PKK of the
Kurdish movement has been listed as a terrorist organization by the USA and EU, while
the Zapatistas movement was able to transcend the internal support to reach out for the
international community. He highlights that the dependence of political violence in the
movement’s struggle against the state is the primary cause of outcomes’ difference
between the Kurdish movement and the Zapatista. (Serhun Al, 2015)
I think that even though one of Serhum’s hypothesis was close to one of my thesis’s
hypothesis, I argue that the use of political violence is neither a primary nor a sufficient
cause, to have brought about the outcome’s difference of the rebel movements. I farther
contemplate to test the transnationalism of the movement in terms of the role of the new
media and international networks in gaining the international legitimacy,
On the other hand, the Polisario front was mostly studied as a single case study, in the
literature I have encountered. For example, Stephen Zunes, discusses the Western
Saharan conflict and argues that the Polisario Front added a lot to the study of African
liberation and development. Zunes claims that the Polisario Front was able to empower
the Sahrawis in their national struggle and allowed for achieving multiple victories in
the international community. This was mainly because of its organizational structure
and political strategies by which it was able to create a dichotomy between democracy
and equality. (Zunes, 1987). Others like Randa Farah examines the reasons behind the
ability of the Polisario Front to resume its national struggle. It was argued that there are
three main factors that fostered the Polisario Front in its struggle with the Moroccan
government which are the Algeria’s sponsorship of their national strategy, the
20

establishment of a “state in exile” and having their own informal economy, and the
development of “self-determination” as their collective identity. Farther, Farah displays
a similar argument of mine that despite the ability of the movement to sustain its
struggle, yet it has not achieved its objectives of self-determination. Adding that, this
falls mainly to the direct influences and interests of powerful states. (Farah, 2010)
However, the above literature did not give an answer of why Polisario front may have
succeeded to win the international recognition but failed to attain its goals and was
rather listed as a “frozen conflict.”
Therefore, I was able to conclude from the work cited above, that there are different
and various arguments displayed for the rebel movements I intend to study. By which
some researchers have predicted a similarity of the movements’ outcomes, others
differentiated them by the use or non-use of political violence. But I argue away from
this, that these rebel movements did not only yield divergent outcomes, but that these
outcomes are not related to the usage of political violence. I claim that this should be
studied from the international relation lens, globalization, and the political opportunity
structure approach. Also, that these divergent outcomes are a result of the interaction
and integration of multiple variables in a particular configuration.

1.5 Research design, Methodology & Limitations

This thesis adopts a mix of methods identified to generally belong to the “Structural
Focused Comparison” approach. The Structured Focus Comparison approach utilizes
the comparative mechanism and is very simple and logic as a method. It will help to
21

establish a systematic comparison and standardized method of collecting data for the
cases under the study. This, though, does not entail that it only compares just points but
as David Collier referred to as “processes unfolding over time”

3

However, the

Structural Focused comparison approach’s main challenge is to draw out of
explanations, a more complex theory. (George and Bennett, 2004)
Moreover, because I propose to find out the causal inference behind the diverging
outcomes that are yielded of the rebel movements with the focus on the Zapatista
movement in Mexico, the Kurdish movement in Turkey and the Polisario Front in
Western Sahara, this means I will undergo a cross-regional comparison. The crossregional comparison is still under the umbrella of the Structural-Focused comparison
approach, yet it is a strategy by which I would use to compare three cases in different
regions. This strategy will assist to correlate the discrete observations and interpretation
of each case to fit a broader context. Conversely, it has its own challenges like the
needed additional skills and collecting of the background information about the regions
under examination. Not only that, but I will also face the hurdle in allocating the local
conditions that feature one case than the others. However, it is prominent to highlight
that this strategy will allow me to generate insights and novel analytical frameworks
that may assist in solving and connecting the debates raised among various scholars
who studied the topic in distinct regions. (Ahram, Köllner & Sil, 2018).
Furthermore, this research will not only compare three cases across different regions
but to compare them across different time periods. Thus, I will base my thesis on
variable based comparisons like those conducted by prominent scholars like Abrams
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Collier D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. PS: Political Science and Politics, 44(4):
823–30
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1982, Skocpol 1984, Tilly 1984 & Ragin 1987. By then, I will be able to display a
strong casual inference that can transcend language barriers and cultural aspects. In
other words, I will take after Jason Brownlee and his rationalization of cross-regional
comparison in “Authoritarianism in the age of democratization”. He argues that
comparing cross-regional cases with dissimilarities in political-economic, historical
factors and international relations will enable to study a wider scope of alternative
accounts and elements. He adds that cross-regional comparisons allow for generating
patterns that transcends the regional-bounded arguments that can neither explain the
cross-regional trends nor the intraregional differences. Thus, cross regional comparison
will foster the study of better political, institutional, or structural explanation that can
account for the divergent outcomes within the same regions and the similarities that
span across three different regions. (Brownlee, 2007).
Therefore, at first, I will need to articulate the common stations that may exist in each
case’s historical setting and pinpointing the relationships among the variables or use
the “Process tracing” research method. And this as Kocher & Monteiro displayed, is
very crucial to be applied before comparing the case studies. This is because process
tracing will allow me to grasp the needed knowledge of history and to articulate the
common stations and points of comparison. This is all very essential especially if the
causal inference plays over a long span of time and entails complex and not only multiactor but multi-level chains of study, like my case studies. (Kocher & Monteiro, 2016)
Thus, process tracing will help -as outlined above- to trace the causal mechanism
through precise and detailed analysis of the casual reasons behind the outcomes
observed in the cases under study. It will foster the thesis’s aim especially that processtracing is consisted of three core components which are theory-building through linking
causes and outcomes, the detailed empirical analysis of the observed and collected data,
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and the complementary use of other comparative methods as discussed above to reach
a more accurate and testable generalizations. (Beach & Rohlfing ,2018).
On the other hand, the challenge will be to carefully trace the historical background and
the important events that will be acknowledged for the first time, especially when it
comes to Morocco. Not only that, but I will also need to refer to a wider literature to
have better understandings of the social and cultural aspects of each case, rather than
only the political aspect. Further, process tracing displays a hurdle of the need to
identify a theoretical starting point which again needs intensive evidence-based work.
(Collier, 2011) I think one of the other limitations I will encounter as well, is that I will
not display every single detail about the case studies’ historical setting, rather I would
only focus on the stations of compare between them. Precisely, I will look at three
particular dimensions which are transnationalism & popular support of the movement,
the degree, extent and the effect of external interventions and the level of democracy
within the state.
I plan to test the hypotheses that might explain the divergent outcomes, through
secondary sources. The hypotheses -that I argue it might affect the dynamics of the
rebel movement and explain this research question- are the extent of “transnationalism
& popular support” of the movement, “external intervention”, and the “level of
democracy within the state”. Therefore, these are my independent variables that would
be measured using secondary sources of archival documents, governmental reports,
books and other scholarly or journal papers.
In the following, the thesis will proceed first with discussing the conceptual framework
and my theoretical model in the second chapter. Then it will display the historical
background, the main stations of comparison and brief analysis of the three rebel
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movements in the third chapter. Thereafter the thesis will test the hypotheses’ relevance
through in-depth analysis of the three rebel movements in the fourth chapter. The fifth
chapter will be the conclusion.

Chapter II. Conceptual Framework

As outlined in the previous chapter, it is of high prominence to articulate and examine
several concepts thoroughly before I delve into discussing the hypotheses and the case
studies. I aim through this chapter to achieve precision and clear identification of my
theoretical model, various concepts, and the independent variables (hypotheses) to
avoid any lack of understanding or unconscious biases when discussing and testing the
causal mechanism in Chapter 4. This is especially that there is an academic conflict
over several concepts I intend to use. It is important to ensure their conceptual
clarification to not undermine the integrity of my hypotheses or the causal mechanism
that will be investigated.
This was proven of prominence by Stathis Kalyvas when he pointed in his article “New
and Old Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction” that sometimes the existent categories in
literature may not be precise enough for the recent events to fit in. Also, it is crucial to
integrate accurate conceptual basis and reliable empirical indicators to enable the
development of a coherent generalization. He adds that this can be done through a
process of careful analytical and empirical examination. (Kalyvas, 2001) Likewise,
Giovanni Sartori outlines that the precise definition of concepts should not only be
considered as elements of a theoretical system but rather data containers through which
facts and information can be realized. He highlights the importance of the disciplined
usage of terms and concepts. (Sartori, 1970). In addition to this, David Collier and
25

Steven Levitsky explain the fundamental care needed when defining and using concepts
to avoid any dismissal of the causal arguments related to the cases under study. This is
because a specific conceptual form would generate decisive components of the
researcher’s central arguments. (Collier & Levitsky, 1997) Thus, it is essential to
achieve the clear identification of the concepts and variables before assessing the causal
mechanism.
Therefore, I will focus on displaying first my theoretical model and discuss thoroughly
two main concepts which are “rebel movements” and, “territorial autonomy”. Then I
will outline my hypotheses or assumptions and how the literature explained their
probable influence over the dynamics of the rebel movements

2.1 The Model of the Thesis

As discussed in the previous chapter and the literature review section, there are several
possible reasons for the different outcomes of the rebel movements. Like, the political
opportunity structure approach and the type of the existent political system, the resource
mobilization approach, and the strategies used. However, I hypothesize that there are
other variables that affect the outcomes of the movement. Not only that, but these
variables are interacting and existing in different configurations and sequence to yield
divergent outcomes.
I found Ted Gurr’s model of “ethnopolitical rebellion” is close to my assumed
theoretical model, but I intend to move beyond it. Ted Gurr combines the three
competing approaches discussed in the literature, the resource mobilization approach,
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the relative deprivation and the political opportunity structure to the group identity and
cohesion approach to explain the prospects of the rebellious ethnic conflict. (Saxton,
2005) On the contrary, my theoretical model is an interactive model between three
hypotheses that aims to develop a causal mechanism for the different outcomes of the
rebel movements. I propose that my interactive model displays the fact that the three
hypotheses may not solely have a direct impact on yielding such outcomes, but that the
rebel movements are influenced by them all. In other words, my model suggests that it
is not about an existing or non-existing variable, but rather a configuration of three
variables that exist in a particular sequence. I claim that the rebel movements’ outcomes
are influenced by three variables, transnationalism and popular support, external
intervention, and the level of democracy within the state. Accordingly, I hypothesize
that these three variables are existing in a particular configuration and sequence in each
rebel movement under discussion, that resulted in such different outcomes. I assume
that the level of democracy within the state determines the state reaction to the rebel
movement eruption and to its transnational networks and popular support. While the
external intervention influences the dynamics of the conflict and the existent balance of
power resulted from transnationalism and popular support.
Therefore, this model transcends the theoretical approaches displayed in the literature
review section in Chapter 1. This is because and as mentioned earlier, I found that none
of the three main approaches discussed (the political opportunity structure approach and
the type of the existent political system, the resource mobilization approach, and the
strategies used) was enough in itself to explain the divergent outcomes of my case
studies. On one hand, the three rebel movements have utilized violent and non-violent
strategies at least at one phase of their struggle. Also, the Zapatista movement acquired
the least resources either financially or militarily compared to the other two movements
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but was the only one that could attain territorial autonomy (not as suggested by the
resource mobilization approach). Not only that, but the three states were at the
democratization phase and they all suppressed the rebel movements at least at one stage
of the conflict. Thus, the model assures that it is not about an existing and non-existing
variable to explain the causal mechanism as proposed in the literature but rather is to a
particular configuration and sequence of variables that interact together and unfold the
different fates of the three rebel movements under discussion.
After discussing the model, it is important to clearly identify “rebel movements” and
“territorial autonomy”.

2.2 Rebel Movements

I found a significant contention in the literature over conceptualizing movements like
those I intend to study. I will try to display this contention first and then pinpoint the
reasons of finding “rebel movements” a precise concept for my case studies.
Firstly, a group of scholars tends to resemble any movement that is representative to
the people who are not identified with the established formal institutions and thereby
seek socioeconomic or political change, as a “social movement”. (Lang, 2005)
Similarly, De La Porta & Diani argue that social movements must construct contesting
relations by which their opponents are pinpointed. Not only that, but they are also
consisted of informal networks and usually are possessing a distinct and clear identity.
(De la Porta & Diani, 2006) Therefore, it is claimed that social movements are more of
organized - yet informal - social entities which are involved in extra-institutional
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conflict to achieve certain set of goals. These goals can be in a form of changing an
already-established policy, introducing new policies, or imposing a radical cultural and
political change. Christian Welzel, explains that not only grievances or relative
deprivation led to the formulation of social movements, but they can be based on shared
values. This means that the existing belief that the individual or a group are
underrepresented and not getting their share of rights equally to other societal groups which can be related to identities like ethnicities, race, or gender - can lead to the
formation of social movements (Welzel, 2012).
From another perspective, Goodwin displays a more detailed conceptualizations to the
movements. For instance, he defines movements that claim control or authority over
the state or some segment of the state as “revolutionary social movements” or
“revolutionary movements”. (Goodwin, 2001). This was found of relevance to Tilly’s
definition of revolutions. However, other scholars like Oiknomakis argue that
Goodwin’s conceptualization is a bit confusing, especially that not all the movements
that seek to control over the state or part of it is characterized by revolutionary aspects
neither in terms of changing the existing state through revolutionary means, nor in terms
of implementing revolutionary or radical social transformations within the given
territory. Some other scholars tend to conceptualize the revolutionary movements that
acquire revolutionary characteristics (and not the emancipatory one) as insurgents.
Thus, the revolutionary movements may not necessarily turn into insurgency, but will
if they chose to seize the state power using violent strategies. (Oiknomakis, 2019).
Moreover, the literature also discusses that there are other conceptualizations to
movements like secessionist, separatist and autonomous movements. Secessionist
movements are on one hand, assemble the fact that they are not revolutions and do not
only seek to overthrow the existing government, instead, they tend to establish an
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independent nation-state. Therefore, a successful secessionist movement is a movement
by which its main goal is to eject itself from a larger nation and establish a new
government within a nationally or internationally recognizable territory. This in turn
differs from the separatist movements which only seek regional autonomy. In other
words, the separatist movements do not demand ejecting themselves from larger nations
but rather to have some sort of political, cultural, and economic autonomy. This
demanded regional autonomy is relative and its extent is varied according to the
agreement set between the movement and the parent nation. (Stein, 2016) Other
scholars tend to identify that these movements are different from the “autonomous
movements”. Cristina Fominaya, for instance, depicts that autonomous movements are
broadly defined as horizontally organized networks by which values like self organization, participatory democracy, autonomy, and direct action are the primacy.
These movements usually reject any form of representative democracy or rule of
majority and favors the non-hierarchical ruling models that are based on selfgovernance and assembly form of decision making. Not only that, but autonomous
movements’ ideology is also heterogeneous and there is no one ideology to define the
movements nor to be officially announced. (Fimonaya, 2009)
This has made the categorization of the cases under the study not an easy task, which I
argue that they are better to be conceptualized as “rebel movements”, a smaller category
of “social movements” and lies between it and “insurgencies”. This is because the case
studies under discussion, have changed their goals and strategies back and forth at
different time intervals between creating an independent nation-state to achieving
regional autonomy. This made it inaccurate to conceptualize and categorize them in any
of the above categories. In other words, rebel movements are more of a category that
encompasses most of the above categorizations but with higher accuracy and distinct
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features. For instance, if rebel movements had its main target to achieve independence
from a foreign rule, by then it might be a national liberation rebel movement. It can also
seek political change and political power, by then it might be an insurgent rebel
movement. Similarly, movements that aim to separate themselves from an already
existent nation-state, are called secessionist rebel movement or a separatist rebel
movement if they only seek a regional autonomy.
Because, as mentioned above, I found it rather precise and comprehensive to use “rebel
movements” for my cases, I will take after Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe and
their definition of rebel movements. They argue that rebel movements are more of
organizations which engage or have engaged at one phase in an armed opposition and
resistance against mainly governments and ruling states. They claim that the rebel
movements’ main target is to seek “change” either in terms of replacing or displacing
the existent governments, reframing of the existent structures and political frameworks,
degrading of authority, and achieving autonomous rule to their regional governments,
or redrawing of national boundaries to establish separate nation-states. (Okumu &
Ikelegbe, 2010).
In all, I define rebel movements as the movements that seek autonomous rule to their
regional governments either through territorial autonomy or secession and have
engaged in an armed conflict at one or more phases in their resistance. This is because,
I think that the earlier categorizations discussed in the literature above, are either too
narrow or too broad for the cases, especially that the movements under the study have
used violent strategies at one point and did not have one specific strategy or aim
throughout the years of their resistance. Some movements like the Kurdish movement
have been back and forth in terms of using violent strategies through their military wing
(PKK), while the Zapatista movement has only used violence for days. Though, both
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movements have used their military wings at one or several points of their resistance.
Similarly, the three movements’ initial goal was “national liberation” which has later
changed for some movements to “territorial autonomy” and back to “national
liberation” for other movements. Hence, the three movements under the study have
sought at least at one time of their struggle to achieve self-determination and secession.
Therefore, I found that categorizing the case studies as “rebel movements” will be more
accurate when discussing either the hypotheses or the case studies.

2.3 Territorial autonomy

Territorial autonomy is -as outlined before- my measure of success to the rebel
movements under discussion. Therefore, I aim to precisely discuss the concept and the
literature debate over it.
Autonomy and territorial autonomy in specific as concepts are considered very crucial
either in social movements’ literature or for the newly erupted rebel movements. This
is because the recent movements tend to engage in conflicts of self-determination and
self-rule or governance in different schemes socially, economically, or politically.
These conflicts are widely spread in Latin America where the most famous ones
discussed in the literature are the “the Caracoles and the Good Government Councils”
governed by the Zapatista movement, “the Federation of Neighbourhood Councils in
El Alto, Bolivia “and the settlements ruled by the Movement of Landless Rural Workers
in Brazil. The rebel movements seeking autonomy are existent in other parts of the
world as well, like in Europe for instance. The “Disobedienti” in Italy, “Autonomen”
in Germany, the “Movement of the Unemployed “in France are all examples of
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European autonomous movements. In Asia, autonomy has also dominated many
peasant movements like the vibrant contention against the genetically modified crops
in India. In Africa, autonomy was foreseen to be the only solution to the various ethnic
deadly conflicts either horizontally or vertically with the colonial powers. (Bohm et al.,
2010)
Thus, despite that autonomy has been a rising feature of the recent social movements
and it has been called for in different regions, it is also considered as the vehicle to
secure minority rights. In other words, autonomy along history as outlined above has
been existent and exercised in different forms and varying degrees. This was officially
highlighted through Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities that entails the responsibility
of the states to protect the identity and rights of the existent minority groups. This may
get addressed through legislative and other measures to secure the situation of minority
groups. Therefore, autonomy is considered a political and a non-violent practice to
settle the existent struggles between states and ethnic minorities. This can be practically
feasible through constitutional accords and peace treaties. (Wheatley, 2005) Thus,
autonomy can range between power-sharing arrangements to regional or territorial
autonomy. Many states found that a degree of autonomy will allow for more stability
and better statehood performance. However, based on literature, this degree varies
according to the political and economic powers of the autonomous party and the
democratic maturity of the state. (Ghai, 2000) Because autonomy is driven from two
Greek words: “auto” and “nomos” which means self and rule or law, respectively,
political autonomy allows to a varying degree the construction of distinct laws. For
instance, it can guarantee the right of the individual to decide independently in certain
issues, to exercising exclusive powers to certain state bodies like the legislation,
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executive and adjudication. However, my lens of focus will be on one form of the
“political autonomy”, particularly the “territorial autonomy” which will be highlighted
upon in the coming paragraphs. Therefore, political autonomy in general allows for
“self-rule” specifically in the field of minority rights and range from selfadministration, to complete self-rule which is one step earlier than complete
independence or secession from the nation-state. (Cornell, 2002)
I intend to define territorial autonomy as a form of autonomy that authorizes a particular
territory to self-rule but without constituting an independent nation state. This entails
that the power authority of the central government is not enforced over the autonomous
entity. This means that the autonomous entities do not have an official representation
in the national parliament, and that they usually develop their executive bodies
separately from the national ones as well, which get elected by the regional assembly.
(Suso, 2010) Thus, territorial autonomy is more of a specific status where a definite
territory is granted self-rule and the authority to regulate its own affairs through
autonomous legislation, executive body, or government, administration and in some
cases an independent judicial unit as well. The territorial autonomous entity should be
able to exercise these authorities over the population within only their territorial area.
Moreover, as much as territorial autonomy does not mean complete secession off the
central state, but it is a mechanism by which the national minority is able to maintain
its identity and to regulate its affairs solely from the central state. Thus, they are not
authorized to demand sovereignty away from the central state, but they could display
and use their own national symbols, establish their own means of communication and
media, set their own educational programs, and foster their values and beliefs.
(Benedikter, 2009)
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After discussing “territorial autonomy” as a concept, it is important to differentiate it
from “Federalism”. Federalism is one of the concepts that are used to be closely linked
to autonomy, despite the major differences. Federalism -for example- still allows for
the central state to exercise power over the federal entities or regions. These federal
entities participate in the process of policymaking, but still the highest powers are in
the hands of the central state over them and they may self-rule only in certain aspects.
This means that federalism creates a multi-level government that is based on shared
rule between the federal or central government and the regional government(s). It
establishes a single political system by which the regional government is inferior to the
central government. Therefore, the authoritative power is divided between the two level
of governments within the political system. (LLuch, 2011) Furthermore, federalismaccording to William Riker- is defined as a political organization that permits the
division of the government’s operations between itself as the central government and
the regional government(s), in a way that allows both the governments to exercise its
authoritative powers over particular issues. (Volden, 2004) The territorial autonomous
regions may also have the right to self-rule and usually in need to set arrangements with
the national institutions of the central power of the national state. This is to
institutionalize the degree of autonomy through the constitutional structure of the state.
Though, as previously discussed, the territorial autonomous entities (regions, province,
or district) are expected to democratically set their own parliaments or assemblies. This
means that the autonomous entities usually do not have an official representation in the
national parliament, and that the executive and the legislative bodies of the autonomous
entities are structured separately from the national ones. This entails that there is no
official authority exerted by the central government over the institutional bodies of the
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autonomous entities. By then, this also means that there are no transferred
responsibilities from the central government to the autonomous entities. (Barter, 2018)
In short, territorial autonomy is different from federalism. It allows a particular territory
not to be politically linked to sovereign state other than geographically being a part of
the nation-state. Also, it does not permit division or shared powers between multi-level
governments, but rather establishing a political system for the territorial autonomous
entity parallel to the national one. This is because territorial autonomy requires that the
autonomous region to have both administrative powers of local entities, a regional
parliament to set legislative laws in basic domains, an independent elected executive
body authorized to implement the legislation of the autonomous region.
Therefore, territorial autonomy is a political status that guarantees a definite territory
the authority to maintain its identity, self-rule and regulate its own affairs through
autonomous legislation, executive body, or government, administration and in some
cases an independent judicial unit as well, without seceding from the nation-state.
However, it is not a multi-level government within the political system like federalism,
rather it allows for establishing two parallel political systems.

The following paragraphs will be divided into three sections to identify thoroughly the
three hypotheses and outline how the literature explained their probable influence over
the dynamics of the rebel movements.

2.4 Transnationalism &Popular Support
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It is theorized that rebel movements or armed groups in general may need or seek to
establish a degree of popular support either internally or externally. This in turn should
assist them to achieve some or all their goals. This relationship between establishing
transnational networks, winning popular support and the relative success of rebel
movements is very fundamental because this base of support assists the movement in
their mobilizations and to construct their repertoire of contention against their
conflicting parties. Likewise, scholars like Goodwin, O’Leary & Silke discuss that the
persistency of the armed groups or rebel movements depends on their ability to maintain
a considerable base of popular support. For instance, they claim that the Marxist
movement’s efficiency to liberate the Kurdistan’s from imperialism and its evolution
into an autonomous movement for only Kurdish Turks and then to a post-nationalist
social liberation movement for Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, mainly falls
back to its popular base of support. It did not only maintain its struggle but has crosscut
several state borders. (O’Connor, 2017)
Thus, on one hand, transnationalism usually refers to different kinds of global or crossborder networks and connections, that allows the rebel movement to increase its
outreach to the global civil society. It is a base of established networks that enhance
communication on different schemes either through exchange of resources,
information, or farther to support and engagement of socio-cultural and political
activities. Literature used to link transnationalism to identity or dispersed ethnic groups.
Despite that this is not necessarily be true, but it is because that most of the transnational
networks are based between groups who share a common identity or share similar
cultural, linguistic, or ethnic ties. Transnational networks proliferated with the
contemporary developments in global communications, like media channels or satellite
TV broadcasting, emails, social media and internet usage, transportation, and cross37

border activities. It has also increased with the rising numbers of NGOs and the
attendees of the international conferences by different rebel movements on issues like
human rights. Thus, getting such popular support and being a transnational rebel
movement is not considered much of an impossible task. However, this does not mean
that all the movements which seek such transnationalism and popular support were able
to attain it. This is because the linkage to global and the national civil society entails
establishing various forms of networks with national and global organizations.
(Vertovec, 2001) So, while transnationalism starts first by constructing various social
spaces because of various transnational interactions and activities across the borders.
The national popular support starts with establishing political networks with various
societal groups and national organizations. These networks usually result in changes to
the existent power relations because they allow the involvement of more actors and
agents.
It is also important to indicate that I found large literature supporting my hypothesis
that transnationalism and popular support increases the probability of the rebel
movements to achieve relatively their goals. Like, Keck and Sikkink argue that
transnational networks and popular support assist in establishing new channels by
which such rebel movements can voice their concerns, or the discriminatory actions
exercised against them in the inter-state system. This will in turn help in engaging
supportive NGOs, establishing new networks by which may increase the political
pressure over the conflicting party or the state. Even farther, this all may lead to the
“Boomerang model” which occurs when the local level was able to seek and maintain
international support against conflicting states. In other words, the boomerang effect is
activated when the local-level movements can establish networks with different bodies,
or actors across national boundaries and get their support. (Keck & Sikkink, 1998)
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Likewise, Lipsky discusses how transnationalism and popular support can affect the
rebel movements’ activities and results. He explains that the existence of popular
support within the conflict, alters the existent balance of power between the two
conflicting parties. (In our case, the rebel movement, and the state). Thus, the
establishment of transnational and political networks are essential for the persistency of
the contentious politics of the rebel movements. Moreover, movements that are able to
link its cause to those of the transnational and various networks or able to match their
concerns and goals with the probable international proponents, have higher chance to
not only gain their support, market widely to themselves but also to attain their goals.
In other words, movements which succeed in grasping the attention of transnational
actors will be able to shed light upon the movements’ concerns and goals either through
lobbying such actors directly or through the media and journalists reporting about them,
which largely assist in the movement’s effectiveness. (Bob, 2006)
One problem the rebel movements might face, is that their goals or causes -which are
usually localized and rigid- fall short to meet or match the international supporters’
agendas and by then fail to gain enough upholding. This entails that such movements
may seek to reframe their causes or the used tactics to grasp the international attention
and win their support. That is why many scholars tend to discuss the favorability of
many of the recent movements to pursue mass mobilizations or civil disobedience
techniques that can easily get international backings. Furthermore, international
supporters tend to look over other variables as well like weighing the costs of risking
their names and reputations. Thus, they seek to primarily ensure the legitimacy of the
movement and the authenticity of their goals, demands and allegations. Not only that,
but the transnational actors or supporters may also evaluate the extent of benefits they
may receive supporting such movements to serve their broader targets. (ibid, 2006)
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Thus, the rebel movements through transnationalism and popular support would be able
to better confront the state’s power and even further amend the existent balance of
power. However, despite it is not my focal point but it is pivotal to highlight that there
are other rebel movements which do not adopt transnationalism and rather concentrate
on the local mobilization. They use different techniques to face the state repression like
placing themselves in remote rural regions, mountains or among the urban
underground, etc. (Salehyan, 2011)
Therefore, I can conclude that I found a wide array of literature that support my first
hypothesis. Transnationalism and popular support open new doors of developing a
social space of interaction that can transcend the official boundaries of the states and
influence the dynamics of the conflict in favor of the movement. This is because
through these networks, the rebel movements can succeed in grasping the attention of
various actors and shed light upon the movements’ concerns and goals either through
lobbying such actors directly or through the media and journalists reporting about them.
This largely impose a political pressure over the state and enhance the movements’
effectiveness of attaining their goals. Not only that, but transnationalism and popular
support also affect the ability of the state control to monitor and dominate the actions
of the transnational rebel movements or to control or limit the external political pressure
exerted over it. These networks allowed the interaction to happen not only among
institutions but among local people or groups in two or more different countries. These
transnational interactions can vary from international conferences, international calls,
and emails, to satellite TV broadcasting, to social media and internet usage, to
constructing official-based agreements and negotiations among various institutions and
groups. So, -as mentioned earlier- while transnationalism starts first by constructing
various social spaces because of various transnational interactions and activities across
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the borders. The national popular support starts with establishing political networks
with various societal groups and national organizations. These networks usually result
in changes to the existent power relations because they allow the involvement of more
actors and agents.
In all, rebel movements may get close to achieve their goals, if they were able to
establish a strong base of transnational networks and supporters. Not only that, but these
should be accompanied by coherent marketing of the cause and the good presentation
of the movement to win the support of the international audience. In short,
transnationalism and popular support allow the rebel movement to increase its outreach
to the global and national civil society.

2.5 Level of Democracy within the state

The level of democracy and the implementation of the democratic values are one of the
thesis’s hypotheses as well. I argued that this variable contributes to the causal
mechanisms that resulted in the divergent outcomes of the three rebel movements under
study. I do not intend to thoroughly discuss the literature debates on “democracy” as a
concept. Rather, I would focus on the key principles of democracy and its influence
over the dynamics of the rebel movements.
First, democracy usually as a concept entails a direct or indirect structure of a
government that is ruled by the people, and not a single ruler, or a military force. Thus,
government forms of monarchy, theocracy, oligarchy, or dictatorships are nixed to
democracy. Democracy should also preserve the key rights of freedom and equality
which usually are attained constitutionally. Without discussing in details the principles
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of democracy, I will display its several core features. Democracy pursues the practice
of basic human rights and civil liberties equally to all the societal groups within a state.
It also ensures the pursuit of free and fair elections to guarantee the existence of open
and competitive political arena. It reinforces the equal participation and representation
in the government to all the factions of the society. It assures the separation of powers
between the legislative, executive and judiciary authorities and by turn promote the
checks and balances. It is also entailed to guarantee the protection of personal,
economic, political, and social rights to the citizens constitutionally. Finally, it should
allow for the freedom of the press and media. (Garada ,2018)
The relationship between different types of the states and the rebel movements is found
to be fundamental. This is because the type of the existent state influences the state’s
reaction to the rebel movement. For instance, it was theorized by Charles Tilly, that
the undemocratic states are more prone to encounter civil wars and continuous armed
conflicts with the rebel movements compared to the democratic states. This is because
the democratic states apply more tolerant mechanisms towards the rebel movements
and to their demands. He further categorizes the democratic and undemocratic states
into four major categories, like the high-capacity undemocratic, low-capacity
undemocratic, high-capacity democratic and low-capacity democratic. He assumes that
the high and low-capacity undemocratic states usually depend on the security forces to
restrict the activities of the rebel movements. The low-capacity democratic state relies
to a limited extent on violence in public politics, unlike the high-capacity democratic
states that effectively monitor and constrict the existence of political violence. (Hui,
2007)
Similarly, Doug Mc Adam and Sidney Tarrow articulate that liberal democratic states
tend to allow for contentious politics because it is usually contained within their
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political institutions and structures like the electoral and legislative bodies. Moreover,
the liberal-democratic states may use repressive strategies but are very limited in its
scope and degree if the contentious politics may bring drastic changes. On the contrary,
the authoritarian states tend to be less willing to allow for the contentious politics. It
usually resorts to using violent strategies to halt such political actions that can put the
political system at the stake. This is especially that any form of contention is perceived
by the authoritarian states as a form of danger to the stability of the state. (McAdam &
Tarrow, 2019)
In addition, and as previously explained in the first chapter, the political opportunity
structure approach in the literature fosters what is explained above. It argues that the
effectiveness of movements falls back to the extent of the opening or the fragility of
political systems to mobilizations. In other words, this means that the existence of open
political systems, unstable relationships between parties, varying electoral results, and
the system’s desire to formulate effective policies, yield more favorable results to the
movements’ performance. Similarly, McAdam, McCarthy & Zald outline that the openstrong and open-weak political structures tend to adopt tolerant strategies in dealing
with social movements and their demands. And on the contrary, the closed-strong
political structures are more into forcing radical attitudes over the movements and
construct rigid strategies against their parties. And by open / close, they mean the ability
of the governmental elites to divert political requests and by weak/strong they mean the
state’s ability to initiate public policies. (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald,1997) Moreover,
there is a proposition that having a democratic political system along with the big
capacity of the social movements will most probably yield favorable results for the
social movements. Thus, authoritarian states along with the low-capacity social
movements tend to result into oppression and may break into civil wars. (Caruso, 2015).
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In all, the literature has endorsed my second hypothesis as well. It showed that the type
of the state affects immensely the dynamics of the rebel movements. This is because
democratic states tend to adopt tolerant measures to deal with the rebel movements and
their demands or contentious politics. Unlike the authoritarian states that tend to use
violent and coercive methods. In other words, the effectiveness of the rebel movements
is high in the democratic states and usually yield the intended outcomes, unlike the
authoritarian states. However, it is crucial to articulate that there are different levels of
each state type like democracy which can range from the transition phase of
democratization and procedural democracy to participatory democracy.

2.6 External Intervention

External intervention is the last variable that I think it might have affected the outcomes
of the three rebel movements under the study. But before tackling it and test its
relevance to be considered one of the causal mechanisms that yielded such divergent
outcomes between the three rebel movements in Chapter 4, it is important to outline its
conceptual meaning and the discussed probable influence in the literature.
External intervention in fact has so many types and effects. There is no agreed definition
in all the academics to this concept; however, it is possible to display its core features.
External intervention in general and according to Ted Robert Gurr in his paper of “Third
party intervention in Ethnic conflicts”, may take the form of either giving assistance,
withdrawing it or to changing the status and the kind of relationships exist between two
or more actors. It also may result in changing the prospects of the ongoing conflict. The
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external intervention even may use different strategies. Military action is not the sole
tool used as a strategy, but there are other tools like the economic sanctions or financial
assistance for instance. Accordingly, external intervention may use both tools as a
mixed strategy combing the economic punishment along the military interference.
Besides the different set of strategies, the external intervention might use, it can also
take various forms. For example, it can be a unilateral intervention usually by major
state powers, or a multilateral intervention by a group of countries, or an international
organization such as the UN. Moreover, external intervention can also be either neutral
with the aim to get the conflicting parties at the table of negotiations and display
possible settlements or biased to one of the conflicting parties. (Khosla, 2004)
The literature focuses on a certain assumption, that the external intervention, whenever
it happens, it is to resolve the ongoing conflict, and to ensure the regional or even the
international stability. This can be through halting the escalation of the use of violence
either by launching cease-fire approaches or by assisting in defeating the opposing
group. (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997) However, the debatable issue here is that such
assumption had merely ignored the different interests and the motivations behind the
intervention decision. Despite that discussing these motivations and interests are out of
the scope of interest of the thesis, it is important to highlight that some intervention may
further destabilize the internal situation.
Besides, it is prominent to also point out that large scope of literature argued that
external intervention usually leads to changes in the balance of power which is
prominent for success or failure of the conflicting parties. It explained that the external
intervention might result in negative outcomes to the rebels if it was a unilateral
intervention in favor of the government or the host state, and with the intervening actor
being a major power (that falls back to its vast number of supplied resources). This was
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based on the assumption that the unilateral intervention is biased to a certain side and
in turn yields an imbalance of power between the conflicting parties in favor of the
state, whereas the multilateral intervention is usually neutral and seeking maintenance
of an agreed balance of power. (Reagan ,1996) Even though, I might agree to some of
the assumptions outlined above, I oppose that multilateral intervention is usually neutral
which was not the case in the Western Sahara conflict.
I though found Regan’s arguments close to the assumption I made. He argues that the
early external intervention in support of the state might yield positive results to the state
against the rebels. This is because the external intervention will reinforce the alreadymighty military force (in most of the cases) and the power supremacy of the state. On
the contrary, early external intervention supporting the rebel movement would prolong
the conflict. This is because the rebel movement may strengthen their situation to
balance their power to the state’s but not necessarily result in decisive victory. (Regan,
2002) In addition to this, Elbadawi and Sambanis explain that the early external
intervention in favor to the rebel movements especially if they are at weaker position
compared to the state, will also prolong the conflict. (Elbadawi & Smabanis, 2002)
Therefore, the above literature supports my hypothesis that the external intervention
and particularly the early external intervention in favor of either the rebel movement or
the state, may lead either to decisive victory to the state or to prolonging of the armed
conflict. This is still considered a failure because the rebel movement may not wither
away but could not attain its targeted goal or my measure of success, which is for my
cases, the territorial autonomy.
After outlining the three hypotheses and how the literature explained their probable
influence over the dynamics of the rebel movements, I intend to move beyond this using
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my interactive model. I claim that, the three hypotheses may not solely have a direct
impact for yielding the divergent outcomes, but that the rebel movements are influenced
by them all. In other words, it is not about an existing or non-existing variable, but
rather a configuration of three variables that exist in a particular sequence that yielded
such divergent outcomes in the cases under discussion. This will be further examined
of its relevance in Chapter four.

2.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter aimed to achieve precision and clear identification of my
theoretical interactive model, different concepts like rebel movements and territorial
autonomy, and the independent variables (hypotheses) to avoid lack of understanding
or any unconscious biases when discussing and testing the causal mechanism in Chapter
4. I proposed that the thesis’s interactive model will reinforce the assumption that the
three variables may not solely have a direct impact for yielding the outcomes, but that
the rebel movements are influenced by them all. In other words, my model suggested
that it is not about an existing or non-existing variable, but rather a configuration of
three variables that exist in a particular sequence that yielded such divergent outcomes
in the cases under discussion.
Moreover, this chapter displayed how the literature explained the probable influence of
the three variables (transnationalism & popular support, level of democracy within the
state and external intervention) over the dynamics of the rebel movements.

It

articulated that transnationalism and popular support allowed for an immense external
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political pressure to be exerted over the state from the global and national civil society,
which assist the rebel movement to achieve its goals. Furthermore, the type of the state
and the level of democracy also affect the prospects of the rebel movements because
democratic states tend to use more tolerant strategies towards the movements and their
demands, unlike the authoritarian states. Last but not least, external intervention seems
to yield unfavorable results if it was an early unilateral intervention in support of the
state or any early intervention in favor of the rebel movement. This is because these
interventions either result in the decisive victory of the state or in prolonging of the
conflict. Both results are considered a failure to the rebel movements because my
measure of success is attaining territorial autonomy.
However, I further claim that and according to my interactive model, what is displayed
in the literature is rather rigid, and narrow-scoped. And I propose that the causal
mechanism to the divergent rebel movements’ outcomes should be examined through
the interaction of the three variables all together and through pinpointing their sequence
and configuration. Therefore, this interactive model transcends the theoretical
approaches displayed in the literature review section in Chapter 1. This is because, I
found that neither of the three main approaches discussed (the political opportunity
structure approach and the type of the existent political system, the resource
mobilization approach, and the strategies used) was enough to explain the divergent
outcomes of my case studies. This all will be explored thoroughly in Chapter 4, but
before doing this, the historical background of the three rebel movements and a brief
analysis will first be discussed in Chapter 3.
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Chapter III. Historical Background

As explained in Chapter 1 & 2, I aim through this thesis to outline the causal mechanism
that can explain my research question through an interactive model. This model
suggests that the three independent variables of transnationalism and popular support,
level of democracy within the state and external intervention interacts in various
configurations and sequences to yield the different outcomes for the three rebel
movements under discussion. Not only that, but that the causal mechanism to explain
the reasons of attaining territorial autonomy or not is not based on the existence of a
variable or not, rather on the interaction of the three variables together. However, in
order to examine this causal mechanism, I will use “process tracing” -as elaborated on
in Chapter 1-to identify the common stations that may exist in each case’s historical
setting and pinpoint the configuration of the three variables for each rebel movement.
In other words, I attempt to show through unfolding the main historical events, the
change of causation that might have led to divergent outcomes.
Thus, in Chapter 3 I aim to display the crucial historical events in each rebel movement
to articulate the common stations and points of comparison. I also seek to present
evidence on the three movements from the existing secondary literature that I will
further use in my in-depth analysis in Chapter 4 for comparison. In order to do this, I
will use Process tracing because -as elaborated on in Chapter 1- it is essential especially
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because the causal inference plays over a long span of time and entails complex and not
only multi-actor but multi-level chains of study, like my case studies. (Kocher &
Monteiro, 2016)
Thus, process tracing will help to trace the causal mechanism through precise and
detailed analysis of history and the reasons behind the outcomes observed in the cases
under study. It will foster the thesis’s aim especially that process-tracing is consisted of
three core components which are theory-building through linking causes and outcomes,
the detailed empirical analysis through the displayed historical data, and the
complementary use of other comparative methods to reach a more accurate and testable
generalizations. (Beach & Rohlfing ,2018).
In all, this chapter will display the pivotal historical events that the three rebel
movements under study have encountered. This will help in explaining the causal
mechanism through unfolding the main historical events, the change of causation that
might have led to divergent outcomes and through presenting evidence on the three
movements from the existing secondary literature. This all-in turn will assist in my indepth analysis in Chapter 4. Thus, this chapter will be divided into three sections. Each
section will discuss one of the rebel movements and will display a brief analysis over
it.

3.1 The Zapatista Movement

First, the Zapatista movement developed roughly in 1994 in Chiapas, Mexico. It was
primarily created as a resistance to the new neoliberal policies enforced over the
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population there. But before delving into the dynamics of the conflict between the
Zapatista movement and the Mexican state, it is crucial to outline the political and social
environment of the Mexican state at the time and the marginalization faced by the
population in Chiapas.
The Mexican state encompassed the largest indigenous population in Latin America,
which is around 15% of the whole population in Mexico. According to the UN Human
Rights Commission, Chiapas is not the only indigenous population in Mexico, and there
are approximately 12.7 million indigenous people who speak 62 different languages.
Though, Chiapas is featured to be the most multicultural and multi-ethnic population
of the Mexican states and the Federal District. It acquires around 1.1 million indigenous
people. Not only that, but Chiapas is also considered one of the richest Mexican states
in its natural resources and occupies 30% of Mexico’s fresh water supply. However,
despite all this, Chiapas was ranked to be the second most marginalized Mexican state
within Mexico. Furthermore, the indigenous populations within Chiapas suffer from
very low income, are roughly below the poverty line, and 70% of them are suffering
from malnutrition. Chiapas was not only marginalized socially and economically as
explained above, but politically as well. This was evidentially vivid throughout the
Mexican history, by which the indigenous population in Chiapas were constantly
blocked from any kind of participation in the governmental decision-making processes
and from reveling any sort of human rights or services like education and healthcare.
(Godelmann, 2014)
However, the hostile situation between Mexico and the Zapatista movement got rather
complicated when the Mexican government resumed its repressive activities and
implemented the NAFTA (North American Free Trade) agreement. This is especially
that the NAFTA agreement has further worsened the low living standards of the
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indigenous population, especially in Chiapas. This treaty led to the increase of the
competition between the local products of the indigenous populations and the
international ones. In consequence, the populations were threatened that their products
cannot stand such competition and will get wiped out off the local markets. In other
words, these neoliberal-polices were enforced to outweigh Mexico’s debt crisis but they
negatively affected the living standards of the poor peasants and the indigenous
communities like that in Chiapas. Not only that, but the Mexican government has
enforced earlier to NAFTA, the agrarian counter-reform in 1991 which altered the
policies set for land redistribution. This reform allowed for privatization of the
collectively owned lands. Thus, such reforms were considered as a “governmental
betrayal” especially after allowing and prioritizing the US and the Canadian large
corporates to rent and utilize the indigenous populations’ lands. And they resulted in
the development of the Zapatista movement to defend the rights and pretentiousness of
the Chiapas population. However, it is still prominent to outline that away from the
negative economic outcomes the NAFTA agreement brought to the indigenous
populations in Chiapas, it has also advocated the implementation of political reforms
that protect the human rights and democratic values. These political reforms had
affected the Mexican state’s reaction towards the Zapatista movement and its
transnational networks later on. (more of this in Chapter 4) (Collins, 2010)
Later, the Zapatista movement established its military wing of EZLN and explicitly
called for putting an end to the Mexican repression and the indigenous segregation.
Though, the Zapatista movement may have officially got well known in 1994, but it
secretly started organizing its rebels at least a decade before that. This was because it
sought to proceed with what their antecedents started with in 1970s. But the triggering
factor that pushed the Zapatista movement to launch their armed rebellion was the
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neoliberal policies or NAFTA implementation in Mexico in 1982. (Scholk, 2007) Thus,
the political, social, and economic marginalization practiced against the indigenous
populations in Chiapas resulted in the development of the Zapatista movement and their
resistance.
The movement’s resistance started as a rebellion and continued as an ongoing process
of constructing new social practices and spaces to combat the domination of the existing
state.

The Zapatista movement’s military wing EZLN, which is also called the

Zapatista Army of National Liberation, was in command at the beginning of the
rebellion and initiated an armed uprising against the Mexican government. Further, it
explicitly announced its resistance to the implementation of NAFTA agreement. This
armed uprising was politically foreseen at start as a guerrilla group targeting the rule of
power; however, this was proven wrong. The Zapatista movement’s armed rebellion
has lasted only for twelve days, and then shifted its resistance to a form of civil
disobedience for another fifteen days. Throughout these fifteen days, the Zapatista
movement focused and succeeded to establish autonomous structures of governmental
bodies and society in the territories of Chiapas. Not only that, but it was also able to
construct a coherent base of networks internally and transnationally. This in turn
grasped a lot of global attention and awareness to the status of the indigenous population
in Chiapas, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Therefore, it is
important to highlight that the armed conflict between the Zapatista movement and the
Mexican government lasted for only 12 days, which was followed by set of
negotiations, cease-fire procedures and civil-disobedience practices. (Scholk, 2010)
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The Mexican’s state reaction to the Zapatista movement and the resistance was violent
at the early days of the resistance, which has changed later. The Mexican government
faced the Zapatista movement initially with the security and military forces. But the
forces were not able to completely combat the armed rebellion especially with the vast
protests, and the engagement of wide sector of the civil and global society. Moreover,
The EZLN was able to take control of four towns in Chiapas, and also of San Cristobal
de las Casas (the tourist town of Chiapas). EZLN continued to use violent strategies
and declared war against the Mexican government for 11 days. This violent period of
the uprising was responsible of more than 300 deaths. However, after 12 days of the
armed conflict, the Mexican government proposed to negotiate and apply cease-fire
measures. These round table negotiations resulted in formulating the 1996 San Andreas
Peace Accords which include the movement’s demands and limitations. (Ronfeldt et
al., 1998)
Though, the San Andreas accords were officially formatted two years after the uprising,
it was implemented in 2001. The accords compelled the Mexican government to
exercise fair treatment to the indigenous people in Chiapas. The Zapatista movement
demanded to institutionalize their political, economic, and social rights through the
Mexican constitution, and called for “territorial autonomy” to exercise full control over
the native territories and their resources. Hence, the San Andreas Accords did not only
guarantee cultural autonomy and political participation, but also constitutionally some
form of self-determination rights and “territorial autonomy”. It is prominent to mention
that the Mexican government despite the accords, did not allow practically any exercise
and did not grant any form of autonomy to the indigenous people at the beginning to
protect the sovereignty of Mexico. However, the Zapatista movement succeeded to
gain the attention of the international arena and to destabilize Mexico. This in turn led
54

to weaken the economic standards of the government and lowered the mutual
confidence between it and the international investors. The Zapatista movement started
using non-violent means, which until only in 2001, the Mexican congress accepted to
launch a law that directly recognizes the multi-cultural nature of Mexico and grants the
indigenous populations territorial autonomy under the united nation of Mexico. (Haar,
2004)
Thus, this territorial autonomy permits the indigenous population to exercise some form
of self-determination, but not to disintegrate completely from the Mexican sovereignty.
Since then, the indigenous population were able to freely choose their political status
and practice their economic, social, and cultural rights through their participation in the
decision-making processes. Moreover, the Zapatista movement introduced new
relationship between the indigenous population and the Mexican government which
was vivid by the development of the “National Commission for the Development of
Indigenous Towns” (CDI). CDI was the framework by which the indigenous population
could channel their legal opinions and protect their rights. Though, it is still crucial to
outline that the tasks handled by the CDI did not meet the required needs of the
indigenous population and fell short to tackle the grievous rights cases. (Scholk, 2007)
Therefore, it is important to point out that the duration of the armed conflict between
the Mexican state and the Zapatista movement was not only short but has yielded to
constitutional changes that guarantees the practice of territorial autonomy to the
populations in Chiapas. Moreover, the state’s reaction to the movement was only
violent at the very beginning of the movement’s eruption, which has changed later on
to negotiations, and cease fire procedures.
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The Zapatista movement was able to utilize new forms and modes of resistance through
transnationalism and succeeded to win the support of both the national and the global
civil societies. In other words, the Zapatista movement succeeded to find relevance of
its goals or aims not only across the Mexican borders but beyond them as well. The
movement developed out of the local and indigenous populations’ grievances and
launched its resistance against the Mexican state but was able to frame its resistance to
also be against the neo-liberal policies and framework that encompassed the Latin
America region. Thus, the Zapatista movement did not only succeed to raise the
awareness on their situation worldwide but was able to link itself to other communities
outside the Mexican borders. The movement was capable to do this due to the growing
grassroots resistance in the region rejecting a similar social and economic deterioration,
the failure of the electoral democracy and the existent governments to satisfy their
population and fulfil the promises of social justice and political participation. The
Zapatista movement by then was able to construct new distinctive social spaces and set
itself for a broader scheme of grievances beyond the short-term goal behind the outburst
of the armed rebellion. The Zapatista movement was always keen to identify itself as a
rebel movement and not as a revolution. This is because the movement’s main aim is
not to get control of the state power, but to establish another framework that guarantee
for the indigenous population a more democratic, participatory, and just rule. The
Zapatista movement aimed to not only establish new collective identities but to
reinforce the existent indigenous identities that are located elsewhere. (Oleson, 2004)
Therefore, the Zapatista movement established a coherent network with other regional
movements, that it become a part of “anti-systemic movement of movements” fighting
the deteriorating results of the neoliberal policies and globalization.
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Moreover, the Zapatista movement was able to be also visible in the international media
at the very beginning of its eruption. It could in the first week of the uprising in 1994,
to grasp the attention of over 140 Mexican and international NGOs, that they rushed in
to cover the incidents in Chiapas. The Zapatista movement thus, was the leading
example of “governing from below”, and it showed that through establishing its own
local and micro autonomy project for its indigenous population in Chiapas. The
Zapatista movement established distinct social and political practices for its indigenous
people in Chiapas away from the Mexican framework of rule. These practices
consolidated its continuous process of seeking its population’s demands of human
rights, resource allocation and territorial autonomy. (Scholk, 2010)
The Zapatista movement did not only succeed to reach out in a short time to other
regional movements and the global civil society, but it also won the support of several
minority groups other than the Zapatistas within Mexico. Despite that the movement
is mainly composed of the “Zapatistas” or the indigenous people in Chiapas, but it
allowed some non-indigenous leadership. The movement portray itself as an
“indigenous peasant movement” and is representing the various indigenous
communities living in Chiapas. Thus, the movement’s support base was domestically
from seven indigenous groups like Tzeltal, Tzozil, Chol, Tjolobal, Zoque, Kanjobal and
Mame. These groups constituted almost the quarter of the Chiapas’s population, but the
movement succeeded to win the corroboration of the rest of the indigenous groups even
if they are not directly committed to the movement. (Schmal, 2019)
Hence, it is important to pinpoint that the Zapatista movement was able to win the
attention of the international community at a very short time interval through
transnationalism. Not only that, but it also succeeded to construct new distinctive social
spaces and set itself for a broader scheme of grievances beyond the short-term goal
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behind the outburst of the armed rebellion. This has helped in linking itself to other
national societal groups, regional movements, the global civil society and easily to fight
for a demand or a cause that grasped the international attention and support. The
movement has also changed its tactics and pursue mass mobilizations or civil
disobedience techniques which could easily get international backings.

Therefore, according to the thesis’s focal point, the Zapatista movement succeeded to
attain territorial autonomy and created the national and the international awareness to
the indigenous population living in Chiapas, and in Mexico. In addition, it had pushed
for constitutional reform that outline the multicultural and multiethnic nature of the
Mexican nation. It did not only attain the expansion of political rights to its population
and assigned these communities greater autonomy and changing the subordinate
position they were in by the Mexican government., but it also permitted their practice
of traditions and languages Accordingly, the Mexican government was pressured to
develop Federal agencies to handle the indigenous issues like the CDI (discussed
above). The Zapatista movement’s armed struggle with the Mexican state was short in
duration and was launched after the implementation of the NAFTA agreement which
besides its negative economic influence over the populations in Chiapas but has
reinforced several political reforms. These political reforms have opened some political
opportunities for the movement’s struggle against the Mexican state. That the
movement was not only able to put an end to the indigenous exclusion and oppression
but to resonate their solidarity around the globe and portray itself as the Global Justice
Movement. The Zapatista movement was also able to establish strong transnational
networks and coherent national popular support). In other terms, the Zapatista
movement established a new kind of authority which is the moral authority by which
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they were able to strongly link themselves to the indigenous communities, international
community and to challenge the hegemonic power of the Mexican state.

3.2 The Kurdish Movement

The Kurdish movement was in fact a result to the very similar grand reasons to that of
the Zapatista movement, oppression, and exclusion either politically, socially, or
economically. The Kurdish problem since the very beginning was mainly due to the
constant official and practical denial of the Kurds by the Turkish State and politics. The
only time the Kurds are accepted into politics is when they are identified as citizens of
the Turkish republic and being affiliated with the Turkish majority. The Turkish state
ideology tends to ignore the Kurdish opponents on different levels, political, economic,
and social especially during the single party system era in (1923-1946). This era was
characterized by being the worst of all eras to dealing with the Kurds. Moreover, there
were two kinds of deprivations practiced against the Kurds, one related to the status of
the Kurds and the other to the socioeconomic conditions of them compared to the rest
of societal groups within the state. These were the fueling factors to the grievances of
the Kurds held during this era, which surprisingly were not translated into any form of
collective action. Since then and after the 1980 coup d’état, the Kurdish movement was
able to get institutionalized and established its military wing, the PKK (the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party which is also composed of a political wing as discussed earlier). (Dag,
2018)
Therefore, the Kurdish movement was a consequence to the constant denial of the
Turkish state of the Kurds and their rights, and to the policies practiced eliminating their
Kurdish identity. The Kurdish movement, in short, is a rebel movement, that at first
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aimed to build a nation-state for the Kurds. This was the initial goal of the movement;
however, this goal and the ideology of the movement has changed since 2005. (due to
the formation of the KCK-discussed in the following pages).
It is prominent to discuss the Turkish state’s reaction towards the Kurdish movement
which is also pivotal to the dynamics of the conflict. The state’s initial reaction towards
the Kurdish movement may also have been brutal like the Mexican state but was more
variant and lasted longer. This is because, since the establishment of the movement and
particularly the PKK, the main ideology was to use violence, to an extent that the
movement legitimized the use of violence even against the civilians. Therefore, the
Kurdish movement and through the PKK (its military wing) engaged in an armed
insurgency with the Turkish government most of the period of 1980s and 1990s.
Accordingly, the PKK started their violent guerilla campaign in 1984. Thus, both the
ideology and the practice of the Kurdish movement was not only refusing the existing
government and established an armed struggle against the Turkish state but also calling
for creating an independent Kurdish state. The Kurdish movement was considered
slightly as a popular revolt by the early 1990s. However, this was not long enough
before its popular uprising had been violently crashed by the Turkish security forces.
(Davis et al., 2007) It is also pivotal to indicate that during this insurgency especially
between 1984 and 1999, the Syrian government allowed for holding the movement’s
main camps in Syria and in the Syrian Bekaa Valley. Similarly, both the Iraqi and the
Iranian states assisted the Kurdish movement in constructing camps for its military wing
(PKK) on their lands. These camps were considered as safe havens for the movement
during the armed conflict with the Turkish army. (Bacik & Coskun, 2011)
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In consequence, the Turkish state exercised several forms of repression over the
movement. It arrested the leader of the movement -Abdullah Ocalan- in 1999 and that
was followed by numerous cases of kidnapping, torture, disappearances and extrajudicial executions and violence under detention Therefore, all that along with the very
low economic prospects for the Kurds, contributed into more people joining the
movement and fostering its strength or political power within the Turkish society. The
relative success of the Kurdish movement to build national popular support in the 1990s
era discussed above, is due to its ability to construct and frame the grievances of the
Kurdish people in an ideological way. This was even fostered by the violent strategies
used by the Turkish government to deal with the movement. Therefore, instead of
halting the performance of the Kurdish movement, the Turkish state unintendedly
because of its strategies fueled for much wider support base for the Kurds, and the
Kurdish movement. (Çağaptay, 2007)
Moreover, the state’s violent reaction continued, and the Kurdish movement had
multiply engaged militarily with the Turkish state, particularly in the Kurdish
dominated regions. This had led to a civil war since the 1980s and lasted till roughly
the 1990s. The Turkish state during the civil war commenced to provide literacy
sessions in Turkish and develop health education courses aiming to forcibly assimilate
the Kurds in the Turkish nation. Not only that, but it also enforced the absolute ban of
using the Kurdish language in the state. This ban was practiced until the end of the
1990s and had further been replaced with the objection to deliver any educational
course in the Kurdish language. (Akyesilmen, 2013)
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However, the Kurdish movement was pushing for rejecting such assimilation policies
and further glorified those who sticked to the Kurdish culture and resisted the Turkish
state’s actions. This was then considered as one of the main goals the Kurdish
movement was seeking to achieve. It was also portrayed as a prominent signifier to the
Kurdish identity. However, this success was not long enough for various reasons, one
of them was the declining capability of the Syrian state to support the Kurdish
movement. This is especially that the Kurdish movement has greatly operated in and
from Syria particularly in the 1990s. In consequence, the PKK leader was caught and
imprisoned in 1999 which in turn have immensely affected the ideology and the practice
of the Kurdish movement. For example, the Kurdish movement ceased the usage of
violent methods and the guerilla warfare. Not only that, but the primary goal has shifted
from creating an independent Kurdistan nation to a more ambiguous goal of seeking a
form of autonomy within Turkey. This was also because that the state’s violent reaction
resulted in the immigration of enormous numbers of Kurds to the Western part of
Turkey and to Europe throughout this period. This was foreseen as a huge hurdle to the
Kurdish movement accomplishing their goals, especially that this mass emigration has
negatively affected the Kurdish unity and dispersed large numbers of Kurds elsewhere
either inside Turkey or outside in Europe. Thus, there were several negotiations
between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish state. These negotiations were
conducted with the imprisoned PKK leader (Ocalan) who was reelected despite he was
still in charge and taking decisions (ibid, 2013)
However, in the twenty first century, the political arena in Turkey has changed a lot and
by then influenced the state’s reaction towards the Kurdish movement. This was
because the AKP rose to power-whose leader “Tayyib Erdogan”- was elected in 2002,
and the Turkish aspirations to join the EU, its directed policies to human rights and the
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Kurdish issue files. Accordingly, and since 2005, the Turkish state exerted intense
pressure on the EU and the US administration to categorize the PKK as a terrorist
organization. And in consequence, the PKK- the movement’s military wing-was
outlawed internationally not only nationally (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2012) This all and
with the arrest of the movement’s leader in 1999 forced the movement to change its
ideology and propose a new discourse of “multi-dimensional” struggle. So, the
movement’s ideology shifted to implement “Democratic Autonomy model”, which is
considered an alternative model of the Turkish nation-state. This new ideology is
institutionalized by establishing the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union) in 2005.
KCK aimed through this multi-dimensional project to establish a new social, cultural,
and political struggle against the Turkish state, by which it would be able to build a
Kurdish democratic nation away from the Turkish nation-state. Thus, the goal of the
Kurdish movement changed from aiming of the secession from the Turkish state, to
establishing a parallel democratic model to it, to rule over the Kurdish nation. (Saeed,
2014)
Thus, since 2005, the Kurdish movement has pursued a different path away from the
security sphere to attain its goals and further has altered their goals. It espoused the
democratic confederacies and in turn refused any form of nationalism or separatism. It
sought to establish new local bodies for self-governing within the Turkish borders.
Therefore, the Kurdish movement sought to pursue some form of territorial autonomy
through developing this as a political settlement between itself, the Kurds, and the
Turkish government. Accordingly, Ocalan announced the practice of “democratic
autonomy” and the development of a bottom-up autonomous self-governance through
the local communities. In addition to this, the Kurdish movement started creating
various forms of organizations and institutions empowered to self-govern. Like in 2007
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it established the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) which is considered a shadow
parliament. Moreover, several schools were built and local councils as well. While these
institutions were developed to deliver the Kurdish movement’s ideas and principles to
the population and exercise its approach of democratic autonomy. The Union of
Committees in Kurdistan (KCK) on the other hand, played an important role to preserve
the Kurdish rights within the Turkish politics. (Castells ,2012).
Consequently, the state’s reaction changed slightly and has officially announced
implementing “Kurdish Opening” policy in 2009. Moreover, the Kurdish-language
channel was allowed to operate in the Turkish state television and studying Kurdish in
multiple universities were accepted as well. Not only that, the highly dense Kurdish
regions were better off economically but still not like the Western region of Turkey.
Further, the pro-Kurdish parties could participate in the local civilian politics. This
means that the Kurdish movement was able to roughly attain some of its goals and
further it could through its political party of the HDP to win some votes of the nonKurdish electorate in Western Turkey. And in the 2015th election, the HDP won around
80 seats in the parliament and became the first pro-Kurdish party which won 10% of
election threshold. However, there were no further concrete political steps taken by the
Turkish government to settle the Kurdish problem, and it resumed operating with antiterror laws against the Kurds, and of listing the Kurdish problem as a “Security
Problem”. Furthermore, the Turkish state did not welcome the KCK much and has
perceived it as another framework to the PKK, that aims to disintegrate the Turkish
state. Accordingly, the Turkish government set various missions of arrests of the KCK
members in 2009 and 2010. There were several secret negotiations initiated between
the Kurdish movement and the Turkish officials between 2009 and 2011, but these all
brought to halt after 2011 national elections. In 2012 and 2013, there were another set
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of multiple announcements of the need to hold peace talks and both sides seemed to see
an urge to reach a settlement. However, these talks were secret and were difficult to
trace its progress. (Casier et al., 2013)
Though, the eruption of the Arab spring and particularly with the development of
Rojava and the PYD, the relationship between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish
state further worsened. This is especially that the PYD had reproduced the first tactics
and the practices of the PKK. This besides that, while the Kurdish movement used its
ambiguous approach of democratic autonomy to allow for “self-defense” practices
against the Turkish government, led to the proliferation of the revolutionary violence
again that was halted since 1999. Furthermore, the guerilla activities did not only
resume but were shifted from the mountains to the high dense Kurdish cities. This all
resulted in a return of military repression by the Turkish government (AKP-led
government) against the Kurdish movement, specifically with the rise of the number of
urban guerilla warfare in 2015. (Park, 2016)
Not only that, but the development of PYD was also backed by the American
recognition has further stimulated the Kurdish movement to launch similar urban
guerillas like the successful one in Kobane. This by then intensified the armed struggle
between the movement and the AKP government. Further, the success of the HDP to
win seats in the parliament (which directly oppose to the presidential system) in the
2015th elections, added much to the violent practices. Even though, the Kurdish
movement’s “declared autonomy” was announced in several regions of various Kurdish
cities like in Diyarbakir, Cizre and Silopi, the success of the PYD in Syria was not
attained in Turkey. This is because the Kurdish popular revolt in Turkey failed to have
the enough strength nor the capabilities against the civil and military power of Turkey.
The Turkish state allowed the security forces to forcibly bring down the Kurdish
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insurgency and impose curfews in various regions and cities. In consequence, it was
documented by the International Crisis group that there were around 1700 people killed.
Not only that, but most of the Kurdish civilian population had escaped before the
Turkish curfews were implemented. (Leezenberg, 2016)
The Kurdish movement -unlike the Zapatista movement- was not able to attain strong
transnational networks nor to build a wider national mass support. Unlike the Zapatista
movement, the Kurdish movement has not reached out to the international community
at the beginning of its eruption, but rather only at the phase of the civil war through
diasporas when a large number of the Kurdish community has immigrated to different
European countries. And despite that these diasporas have created various associations
in several countries but their influence over the Kurdish struggle against the Turkish
state was minor, and that their existence in the international media was limited. In
addition, the Kurdish movement’s strategy was to develop a coherent Kurdish support
base, and by then it depended heavily on mobilizing and winning the collaboration of
the Kurdish societal groups only. This is turn affected its popular support nationally
which was limited only to the Kurdish communities and neglected other societal groups.
For instance, the Kurdish movement linked the Kurdish national affairs to the Kurdish
women’s issue in Turkey, promising the liberation of both, the Kurds, and the Kurdish
women. It was not able to find the linkage to other movements or groups nor to frame
its goal in a way to win sufficient international attention and support. It has only limited
its approached to a specific community. (Novellis, 2018)
Thus, in conclusion, the Kurdish movement in Turkey was not only engaged in longer
struggle with the Turkish state compared to the Zapatista’s struggle, but it also failed to
attain any of its goals. In other words, it was not able either to hold on to its relative
political success at the beginning, not to pursue territorial autonomy (my measure of
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success). It, nevertheless, reengaged in an armed struggle with the Turkish government
that led to a huge loss to its societal credibility and political achievements. The Kurdish
movement was not able to construct transnational networks at the beginning of its
eruption but rather at the civil war phase. This is because it was able to have an
international reach out through the diasporas who immigrated to different European
countries. However, the diasporas influence over the dynamics of the struggle was
limited in scope compared to the Zapatista’s. Not only that, unlike the Zapatista
movement, the Kurdish movement was not able to reframe its goals to win the
international attention and support and limited its national mass support to the Kurdish
communities within Turkey only. Last but not least, the movement’s insurgency was
launched at a time where there were no political reforms implemented by the state until
the 2000s and involved several forms of external interventions by different states and
states.

3.3 The Polisario Front

The western Saharan conflict which is the earliest and the longest struggle among the
three rebel movements under study, has started in 1975.
The conflict started when the Morocco’s’ king succeeded to persuade Madrid with the
help of the US pressure to decolonize the Spanish Sahara. The Spanish government
sought to avoid a probable colonial war and handed the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and
Mauritania without counselling with the Western Saharans or the Sahrawis (the natives
of the region). Consequently, Morocco has claimed that the Western Sahara region is a
part of its territory and confronted Mauritanian’s counter claim. These claims were
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refused and opposed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and announced the right
of the Saharawis of independence. Since then, the Sahrawis launched their insurgency
against the Moroccan state demanding their independence. However, Morocco has
invaded the region and allowed the settlement of 350,000 Moroccan civilians there.
This invasion was known as the Green March. The Green March resulted in the fleeing
of nearly half of the Sahrawis population from 1975 to 1976. There, they established
the Polisario Front and the military wing SPLA. The Polisario Front was militarily and
diplomatically supported by Algeria as well. This has allowed the movement to
establish its headquarters and four camps of refugees near Tindouf in Algeria. Morocco
sought to counter such support and asked its allies (ie, France, Saudi Arabia & United
States) for assistance. Since then, and the struggle has been a stalemate because neither
Morocco was able to destroy the Polisario Front without invading Algeria, nor the
Polisario Front can win their territory back. Therefore, likewise the Saharawis have
faced several forms of marginalization like the other two cases. (Mundy, 2006)

However, unlike the Zapatista movement, the external intervention of foreign actors
was -as briefly outlined above- since the early beginning of the conflict. This was either
through the ICJ at the very beginning or when the UN has intervened and sought
arbitration in 1975 from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The UN aimed to
legally articulate which conflicting party has the right of sovereignty over the Western
Saharan region. The ICJ in turn has unanimously announced and recognized the right
of self-determination to the Polisario front and the Saharawis. (Omar, 2008)
The external intervention was also in terms of the Algerian support to the Polisario
Front and the Moroccan allies. These external interventions triggered the Moroccan
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government to directly engage with the Polisario Front. In other words, the Morocco’s
allies -France, United States and Saudi Arabia- assisted in building a large defensive
barrier that repelled the Polisario fighters and halved geographically the Western Sahara
region from north to south., and also in confronting the Western Saharan movement
militarily. Thus, this external intervention fueled the armed struggle and assisted the
Moroccan government through the built wall to have a control over the disputed
territory. This wall was also supplemented by technological radars and sensors to detect
the Western Saharan movement’s fighters. This all affected the movement’s control
over the territory and resulted in high Moroccan presence. Morocco was able to exercise
a physical control over two thirds of the Wester Saharan region, but this did not result
in deteriorating the movement operating from Algeria. It rather led to develop a
Moroccan-Algerian hostile relation, especially when Algeria closed the land borders
from its side since 1994 affecting immensely the tourism, which till now are not
reopened. Algeria further decided not to open the borders until there are coherent
settlement is implemented to the Wester Saharan conflict. Since then, Polisario front
was able to develop its headquarters and multiple camps for its refuges in Algeria as
discussed earlier. Further, the Polisario Front established the SADR (Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic) in 1976 after the Spanish and Mauritania’s withdrawal from the
territory and turned the conflict from the very beginning from being only a struggle
between the Moroccan government and a movement, to a conflict between Morocco
and a government in exile. In other words, the movement performed its armed struggle
for the sake of legitimizing the SADR. (Miller, 2014)

Another form of the external intervention was through the various OAU and UN
settlement proposals. The conflict was brought to halt through cease-fire procedures
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after the UN’s (United Nations) proposal to meditate in 1988. This proposal was a form
of continuity to what the OAU (Organization of African Unity) started in 1976 till 1984.
These OAU efforts pinpointed that the solution should be a cease fire practice that is
followed by a referendum on secession of Western Saharan region from Morocco.
Despite the strong favorability to such proposal from the movement, and the official
acceptance announced by the Moroccan government in 1981, there was not any
concrete or practical steps taken to implement such proposal. In consequence, the OAU
confirmed on the SADR’s (Polisario-led Saharan Arab Democratic Republic)
legitimacy and recognized it as the legal government of the Western Sahara region.
Accordingly, Morocco withdrew from OAU and the conflict was brought to stalemate
until UN’s proposal in 1988. The UN tried to set a resolution to the ongoing conflict
and displayed its proposal through the Security Council in 1991. This proposal called
for also a ceasefire practice, a referendum of secession but added two more articles, the
repatriation of refugees and reducing and seizure of the troops. This framework yielded
various point of conflicts between the two sides, like who is eligible to vote into such
referendum, etc. Hence, these negotiations resulted in creating “The United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)” in the 1990s which is
responsible to declare the eligible voters’ criteria. But France and United States opposed
to such decisions and in turn the Security council declared its halt. This is especially
that the Security Council does not own any enforcement setting if the results of the
referendum are not approved by one of the sides. (Mordi, 2015)
Furthermore, there were other various proposals to have a “third way settlement” for
the conflict that would lie between the full independence and the full integration of the
Western Sahara region within Morocco. In other words, the proposals called for
granting the Polisario Front territorial autonomy, by which the movement would be able
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to have enough delegated authority to create their ruling government under the higher
Moroccan authority. This however was not neither accepted by the Moroccan
government nor the movement, and such multiple negotiations have fostered the mutual
hostile between the two sides. Based on that, and in 2001, James Baker, the special
envoy of the United Nations declared another draft for a conflict settlement proposal.
This draft ensured that the Polisario front should be granted a four-year significant form
of autonomy which would be followed by a “final status” referendum. This proposal
despite being approved by the Moroccan government this time, got opposed to by the
movement. This was the case for so many years, while the Moroccan government does
not offer a concrete approach to grant the movement a realistic form of autonomy and
refuses any form of independence, the movement objects to any settlements away from
the 1991 plan. (Theofilopoulou, 2006)
In addition to the external interventions, the state’s reaction to the movement was back
to violence which had resulted in the resumption of the armed conflict especially after
the 2000 referendum got abandoned. The Moroccan government continued to practice
its repressive measures against the Sahrawis in their territory. The 2003 Peace Plan set
by Baker, allowed for Moroccans who are listed as natives in the Western Saharan
region to vote in the referendum. This posed a lot of pressure over the movement and
its credibility in front of its population. Consequently, the armed conflict resumed in
May 2005. This 2005-armed conflict started when a Western Saharan demonstration
being forcibly combatted by the Moroccan police, which infuriated many of the
Sahrawis activists who pushed to respread the pro-independence sentiment across the
population. The situation got worsened with the enormous numbers of arrests to the
protestors and their tortures, and with the brutal assaults against the youth Sahrawis,
which has led to the death of one in the streets of Al-ayun. Accordingly, the movement
71

started to use civil disobedience strategies and called itself as “Intifadah al-Istiqlal” or
“struggle of independence”. This has not only showed the shift of the movement’s
practice, but the conflict was also handed to the nationalist Sahrawis living in the
occupied Western Sahara or who lived under the Moroccan rule. However, despite the
movement’s change of strategies, the Moroccan government was still able to rule over
the Western Sahara to a large extent, through leverages to the obedient citizens.
Especially that, the economic conditions of the western Saharan region were low and
deteriorating. (ibid, 2006)

Unlike the other two rebel movements, the Polisario Front won as outlined earlier an
international recognition from several international organizations and states. This was
even consolidated in 2009. In 2009, twenty-one members out of total fifty in the African
Union, have officially recognized Western Sahara as an independent sovereign state.
This means that almost half of the union have agreed to legitimize the western Saharan
region self-determination. However, only nine of the twenty-one states allowed for
diplomatic relationships through hosting the Western Saharan movement’s
representatives in their capitals. In 2010, there were second round of negotiations
between the Moroccan government and the Western Saharan movement supervised by
the United Nations and other observer countries like Algeria and Mauritania. But these
recent events of the struggle did not yield any political settlement. (Pham, 2010)
Moreover, the movement’s struggle was largely ignored, and the movement was unable
to build transnational networks, despite being legally and internationally recognized.
On one hand and as discussed above, the younger generation of the movement have
shifted the tactical methods of the movement to only use peaceful resistance. And this
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in consequence assisted much to be accepted in the international community especially
within the scope of human rights issues. The movement has also succeeded to legally
win the right of sovereignty over the Western Sahara region against Morocco through
the ICJ in 1975 and gain the support of several states and international organizations,
like the OAU, the ICJ, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Syria. In addition, the Polisario
Front was also granted recognition to SADR from 70 different countries in 1987. But
on another hand, the conflict has neither ended, nor won the international attention
expected. In other words, the conflict is not only still a stalemate but is internationally
perceived as a marginal issue either in the international political arena or the
international media. This may be because of the existence of Pro-Morocco veto powers
in the security council like France and US, which refuted the UN resolutions that
included the option of independence or a referendum on self-determination. This is also
in addition to the absence of any concrete implementation mechanism by the United
Nations towards the conflict. Not only that, but unlike the Kurdish movement, there
were no diasporas in the European countries or elsewhere than the government in exile
in Algeria. The Polisario Front was not also able to link itself to other movements nor
to reframe its goal away from national independence of the Saharawis. (Zoubir, 2018)
Not only the movement was not able to construct strong transnational networks besides
the UN and ICJ recognitions, but its national base encountered divisions, too. The
movement’s leadership encountered a lot of internal struggles between the government
in exile and the nationalists in the Wester Saharan territory. This means that the
movement was not only able to limit its popular support to the Saharawi communities
only, but this base held divisions as well. The nationalist Sahrawis believe that the
movement became inefficient and by then do not define themselves with it much as
before. The Polisario Front’s leadership in exile according to the nationalists, failed to
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attain independence because of the external intervention and the Moroccan bilateral
relations with different countries like France, and US. Therefore, the nationalist
Sahrawis sought to try a different strategy away from the old ones, which is the nonviolent tactics, and imitate other movements like those in Philippines and South Africa.
They aim to spot the repressive practices of the Moroccan government and win the
international sympathy and support. (Hodges, 2007)

In all, the Polisario front’s conflict with Morocco has been unresolved for over four
decades now. This is may be the longest struggle in duration among the three cases
under discussion. However, the Polisario front unlike the Kurdish movement for
instance was legally recognized to gain its sovereignty and to practice its selfdetermination rights. It was listed by the United Nations and since 1963 as one of the
territories that need to be decolonized. Not only that, but the ICJ refused to support
Morocco’s claim of territorial integration of the Western Saharan region in 1975 and
granted the Western Saharawi’s the principle of self-determination. However, the
movement encountered the involvement of several foreign actors since the very
beginning of its eruption, was not able to develop strong transnational networks nor
coherent national popular support even among the Sahrawi community and faced
repressive reaction from Morocco.
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3.4 Conclusion & Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, this chapter aimed through the “process tracing” mechanism to unfold
the main historical events of each rebel movement under discussion and its struggle
with the state. This was of high importance to help in identifying the stations of
similarities and differences, and the change of causation that might have led to divergent
outcomes. This has also allowed to briefly pinpoint the configuration of the three
variables for each rebel movement and in turn will facilitate the examination of the
causal mechanism and the interactive model in Chapter 4.
This chapter highlighted that the Zapatista movement was able to attain territorial
autonomy -my measure of success-, while the other two movements did not. Not only
that, but the Zapatista movement was the shortest in duration and has only engaged in
an armed conflict for 12 days, compared to the other two movements. Moreover, the
role of the external intervention was limited to transnational networks of the Zapatista
movement and did not involve wide array of foreign actors like the other two
movements. Furthermore, the states’ reaction towards the three rebel movements were
very variant, despite that the three states have repressed and used violent strategies at
least at one phase of the struggle.
Hence, I attempt after tracing the pivotal historical events and displaying this brief
analysis to outline the different configurations of the three variables for each rebel
movement in Chapter 4 and examine the causal mechanism through in-depth analysis.
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Thus, Chapter 3 did not only point out the important historical stations for the three
rebel movements but displayed a brief analysis by which Chapter 4 will depend on to
test the causal mechanism.

Chapter IV. The Configuration of Variables

In the previous chapters, I tried to pinpoint precisely the concepts that my thesis will
focus on and display the prominent historical events of the three rebel movements that
will enable me to empirically investigate the causal mechanisms leading to the different
outcomes, using comparative analysis. Thus, in Chapter 2, I outlined clear identification
of my interactive theoretical model, the different concepts like rebel movements and
territorial autonomy, and the independent variables (hypotheses) to avoid lack of
understanding or any unconscious biases when discussing and testing the causal
mechanism. I proposed that my interactive model will reinforce the assumption that it
is not about an existing or non-existing variable, but rather a configuration of three
variables that exist in a particular sequence which yielded such divergent outcomes in
the cases under discussion. Accordingly, in Chapter 3 I used process tracing to point
out the sequence and the interaction of the variables for each movement and articulate
the common stations and points of comparison. Not only that, but I also tried to present
evidence on the three movements from the existing secondary literature and do brief
analysis that I will build on for my in-depth analysis in Chapter 4. And, as discussed in
Chapter 3, the Zapatista movement was able to practice territorial autonomy that was
legally or constitutionally ascertained in 2001, but the Kurdish movement and the
Polisario Front did not only fail to pursue such outcome but have resumed its armed
conflicts with the states.
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Thus, in Chapter 4, I will focus on discussing the causal variables and their
configurations to explain such different outcomes and test the relevance of my
interactive model and my variables which are transnationalism and popular support,
external intervention, and the level of democracy within the state. This is especially that
the level of democracy within the state might be an antecedent variable to the other two
variables. Not only that, but its presence might have a bigger account for the ability of
the Zapatista movement to practice territorial autonomy. This does not mean that the
other variables are not significant but that the level of democracy might be antecedent
to them and a more significant background condition.
Therefore, this chapter will discuss the rebel movements through the three different
variables and point out their configurations and sequence that might have resulted in
such divergent outcomes. I will first compare each variable among the three rebel
movements and then pinpoint their configurations or sequence in each case in the
discussion section.

4.1 Transnationalism & Popular Support

As discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2, transnationalism and establishing political
networks are sought by the rebel movements to establish a degree of popular support
either internally or externally. This in turn should assist them to achieve some or all
their goals. This relationship between establishing a base of supporters and the relative
success of rebel movements is very fundamental because this base assists the movement
in their mobilizations and to construct their repertoire of contention against their
conflicting parties, i.e., the states. This means that these transnational networks and
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popular support should involve internal, global, cross-border networks and connections
which seek support from various national and international networks like NGOs (Nongovernmental organizations) or other rebel movements. This in consequence might
assist in establishing new channels by which such rebel movements can voice their
concerns, or the discriminatory actions exercised against them in the inter-state system.
(Vertovec, 2001) Not only that, but -as also discussed in Chapter 2-, transnationalism
opens new doors of developing a social space of interaction that can transcend the
official boundaries of the states and influence the dynamics of the conflict in favor of
the movement. This is because through transnationalism, movements can succeed in
grasping the attention of transnational actors and shed light upon the movements’
concerns and goals either through lobbying such actors directly or through the media
and journalists reporting about them. This largely impose a political pressure over the
state and enhance the movements’ effectiveness of attaining their goals. Therefore,
transnationalism also affects the ability of the state control to monitor and dominate the
actions of the transnational rebel movements or to control or limit the external political
pressure exerted over it. Transnational networks allow the interaction to happen not
only among institutions but among local people or groups in two or more different
countries. These transnational interactions can vary from international conferences,
international calls, and emails, to satellite TV broadcasting, to social media and internet
usage, to constructing official-based agreements and negotiations among various
institutions and groups. This all should also be accompanied by coherent marketing of
the cause and the good presentation of the movement to win the support of the
international audience. (Bob, 2006) In short, transnationalism and popular support
allows the rebel movement to increase its outreach to the global civil society, and the
national civil society.
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In the following paragraphs, I will shed light on the degree and the extent the three
movements have succeeded to win the support of the national civil society and the
global civil society. I will also test the relevance of “transnationalism and popular
support” as a variable to rebel movements’ attaining territorial autonomy.

4.1.1 The Zapatista movement & Transnationalism and Popular support

First, the Zapatista movement was at a weaker situation militarily compared to the
Mexican government. The Mexican government announced that the military wing of
the movement -the EZLN- has only about 1500 well-armed fighters and the other
thousands are poorly armed and trained. (Wager & Schulz, 1995) However, the
enormous political pressure set over the government out of the transnational influence
and the popular support pushed for seeking negotiations. These negotiations, however,
was not successful to attain territorial autonomy. But the Zapatista movement was able
to maintain its political strength through the flow of moral, tactical, and indirect
assistance from different supporters and transnational networks around the globe. In the
following, there are two subsections, one will discuss thoroughly the strategies used by
the Zapatista movement and the second will analyze the effect of the strategies and the
hypothesis over the outcome of the movement.

4.1.1.1 Its strategy
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The Zapatista movement was able to construct transnational networks at the very
beginning of its struggle. Not only that, but the Zapatista movement was also able to
take control of four Mexican towns and the major city of San Cristobal in southern
Mexico, at the same day of the uprising eruption. The Mexican government faced a
huge political pressure not only from the Zapatista movement but from their new base
of support established through the usage of media or from the national and international
linkages with NGOs. This all has resulted in the Mexican government announcing a
unilateral cease-fire and allowing the Zapatista movement to not only hold on their arms
but the territory of Chiapas as well, only after twelve days of the struggle. Thus, the
Zapatista movement used two main strategies that will be discussed in the following
paragraphs. The first is winning the support from the international and national actors
through establishing a common goal, and the second is grasping the attention of the
media since the very beginning of the struggle.
The first strategy of the Zapatista movement was in terms of portraying itself as a new
transnational movement that stands against the neo-liberalism, globalization and push
for democratization in the Latin America region. By that, it could establish a common
goal that fits in the international community and considered legitimate. In other words,
the Zapatista movement was able to find and link its causes to other transnational
networks or was able to match its concerns and goals with the probable international
proponents. This has led to have higher chance of gaining their support and to widely
market itself. It attained all that because there were enormous numbers of transnational
NGOs and institutions that dissented the NAFTA agreements issued in 1993 and the
global economic liberalization. In short, the movement’s approach created a linkage
between its causes and much of the Latin American NGOs that experienced similar
events in 1993. (Bob,2001) For instance, these dissents to neoliberalism were solid to
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various leftist’s organizations which offered a wide range of support in terms of money,
supplies, and further spreading the information of the Zapatista movement outside
Mexico to establish broader network. Similarily, another set of various NGOs and
institutions that are concerned with the humanitarian, social justice, and development
backed the Zapatista movement due to the common morals and slogans. Like, the
indirect support handed over by Peace Brigades international and Witness for peace to
the Chiapas communities in terms of development aids. These development aids were
given to the Chiapas communities as an indirect support to the Zapatista movement, to
compensate any harm to them as a result of the Zapatista movement’s conflict with the
Mexican government. Furthermore, the international human rights organizations like
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and International Commission of Jurists
have also played prominent role through their constant investigation on any human
rights abuses throughout the duration of conflict between the Zapatista movement and
the Mexican state. These organizations assisted in monitoring the procedural and
violent actions of the Mexican government towards the movement which risen up the
pressure on it. This all has helped to keep the situation of the Zapatista’s and the
Zapatista movement under the focus of the international lens for over than seven
consecutive years, unlike the other two movements under discussion or even the other
movements operated in Mexico as well. (Ronfeldt et al., 1998)
In addition to this, the Zapatista movement was able to frame its goals and causes in a
way that did not only allow the establishment of transnational networks that were
essential for the persistency of the contentious politics but that developed a national
base of support as well. This is because the movement did not only reject the NAFTA
propositions, and embraced a pro-indigenous scheme, but also have proposed a
democratic reform that the Mexican state should undergo and established it in its
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territorial base of Chiapas. Moreover, it portrayed itself as an “indigenous peasant
movement” which is representing the various indigenous communities living in
Chiapas. Further, the Zapatista movement proposed a “National Democratic
Convention” in Chiapas which had around 6000 civil society attendees and established
various autonomous communities in 38 municipalities in Chiapas. By that, it succeeded
to win the direct support of several minority groups other than the Zapatistas within
Mexico and has even allowed some non-indigenous leadership in the movement.
Hence, the movement’s support base enlarged and become consisted of seven domestic
indigenous groups besides the Zapatistas like Tzeltal, Tzozil, Chol, Tjolobal, Zoque,
Kanjobal and Mame. These groups constituted almost the quarter of the Chiapas’s
population, but the movement was able to further win the corroboration of the rest of
the indigenous groups even if they are not directly committed to the movement. In
addition, it also found a huge support from indigenous organizations and indigenous
rights groups like the National Congress of American Indians, the Indian Law
Resourced Center, and the Assembly of First Nations. (Munoz, 2006)
The second strategy of the movement was through different modes of media networks.
The Zapatista movement was visible in the international media at the beginning of its
eruption and could in the first week of the uprising in 1994 to grasp the attention of
over 140 Mexican and international NGOs. These NGOs rushed in to cover the
incidents in Chiapas. Not only that, but the Zapatista movement placed itself in different
consulates and spread their grievances and demands through the internet. It was able in
the first two weeks of its struggle to have around 471 published stories on the Zapatista
movement in very influential well-known international newspapers. Not only that, but
the Zapatista movement sought to be constantly visible in the press through holding
various conferences and interviews even at the time of the round tabled negotiations. It
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further allowed the international journalists and the supporters to exist physically in
Chiapas which was well-secured by the movement to guarantee their safety.
Accordingly, it was also able to reach out to different leftist intellectuals and academics
through both, its leader’s -the masked Subcommander Marcos-speeches and letters, or
through the internet (emails and websites) (Gilbreth & Otero, 2001)

4.1.1.2 Analysis

Thus, based on the facts discussed above, it is important to articulate that the Zapatista
movement did not acquire much of the economic nor military resources compared to
the other two movements, or to the Mexican state, but its mobilizing forces were fast,
high, and wide scoped either locally or transnationally as outlined above. It was able
in short time to mobilize locally over than thousands of rebels to join the insurgency
against the Mexican state in 1994 as mentioned earlier and was able to secure the
Chiapas. Moreover, it was also able to take over several towns and the San Cristobal as
its territorial base for further base of networks. In all, the Zapatista movement was
positively popular in the Mexican civil society and the global society since the first two
weeks of the struggle and this has assisted in spreading the information of the movement
and increasing the reach out of their interviews and speeches.
The influence of such fast and wide scoped transnational networks and popular support
was vivid in 1994 and in 1995. In 1994 and after only 12 days of the struggle, the
Mexican government assigned governmental bureaucrats as mediators to solve the
conflict and applied a unilateral cease fire measure. Also, in 1995, when the Mexican
government commenced a military launch against the Zapatista movement again, the
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national and the international allies were able to politically force the government to
undergo another set of negotiations and halt such operations. This political pressure has
resulted in issuing the 1996 San Andreas accord on indigenous rights, but with no
implementation progress until 2001. (Arman, 2013) This is because, the Zapatista
movement during this period was able to preserve their control over significant areas of
Chiapas and could maintain its local and international support. This constant popular
support was through the continuous mutual contact with their supporters through email
and internet websites, and the backing from multiple transnational NGOs that backed it
up in four different sectors.
Therefore, it is very crucial to outline that the Zapatista movement was able to establish
fast (in the first weeks of the struggle) and wide- scoped transnational networks and
popular support. These networks and base of support was through using two main
strategies, which are linking itself to other movements and organizations nationally and
internationally, and its high and constant presence in the media and by then in the
international community.

4.1.2 The Kurdish Movement & Transnationalism and Popular support

The Kurdish movement on the other hand, unlike the Zapatista movement faced various
of problems to its approach towards transnationalism and popular support or to fostering
its national and international existence. Unlike the Zapatista movement, there was not
a fast or coherent strategy to transnationalism and popular support except later when
large number of the Kurdish community immigrated from Turkey and created diasporas
in different European countries. It also failed to win the support of the national civil
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society besides the Kurdish communities. In other words, the Kurdish movement was
unable to build a strong popular support base or transnational networks at the beginning
of its development, nor to find linkage of its goals or causes to other movements,
organizations, or societal groups. Not only that, but its strategies later on through mainly
the diasporas did not also yield enough support or guarantee a wide-scoped existence
in the media. Thus, in the following paragraphs, I will shed light on the strategies used
by the Kurdish movement to seek transnationalism and popular support and their effect
over the outcome of the movement.

4.1.2.1 Its strategy & Analysis

First, -as discussed in Chapter 3 -since the movement’s very beginning in 1982, it
encountered a constitutional oppression in terms of cultural and political repression that
were accompanied by the embargo of using the Kurdish language in public that was
later lifted in 1991. Thus, the Kurdish movement was not able to vocally market itself
either locally or internationally to gain the needed the support. However, in 1980 and
the military coup witnessed in Turkey, many of the Kurdish movement’s leaders and
nationalists have fled to Europe and have created an opportunity of diasporic
transnationalism. (Bruinessen ,1998) It sought through the fleeing leaders to establish
a political space in Europe by which it develops a condensed network of supporters. It
was able especially with constant flow of Kurdish nationalists to Europe to develop
eight associations in Germany, one each of the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and
France. These associations were merely established to tackle the problems faced by the
Kurdish immigrants in Europe and then to back up the Kurdish movement in Turkey
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when needed. Further, and by the late 1990s, the Kurdish movement was able through
its rising existence in Europe to expand its influence and participate in the political
lobbying for the Kurdish rights and autonomy either in Turkey or in the other European
countries. It is also crucial to pinpoint that over the years, the Kurdish movement could
construct other associations in various European countries that enabled the movement
to mobilize thousands of Kurds living in Europe at the critical events happening in
Turkey. That it was relatively able to grasp the attention of the international community
like those of Germany and Belgium especially with the rising cases and events of human
rights’ violations. (Inglis, Akgonul & Tapia, 2009)
However, despite all this, the Kurdish movement could not maintain such support nor
widen its scope. This is because the Turkish state both of its right and left wings were
able to construct transnationalism relationships with different levels of organizations
and institutions ranging from the grassroot groups to other forms of formal state
institutes in Europe. This left the diasporic transnationalism of the movement
inefficient. The movement’s aspires were also brought down with the Turkish stance
towards the supporters of the Kurdish movement within Turkey itself. It for instance,
politically expelled seven members of the parliament because they have participated in
an international conference in Paris 1989 that was organized by the Kurdish institute
for discussing the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Not only that, but there were neither
direct support or indirect assistance given when the movement’s leader Abdullah
Ocalan was expelled out of Syria and sought to be accepted as an asylum in any of the
European countries. Further, the Kurdish movement and particularly its military wing
of the PKK -after an intense Turkish pressure and the movement’s resumption of armed
conflict after a period of ceasefire- was listed by 2004, as a terrorist organization by the

86

Council of the European Union and since then it got nationally and internationally
sided. (Uzun, 2014)
The Kurdish movement may have tried to transnationally expand its base, using media
like the Zapatista’s but it was also not efficient enough. Despite that the Kurdish
movement started to publish different publications through various Kurdish journals in
Istanbul after 1908, it was not long enough until the Turkish state banned the Kurdish
press. Not only that, but in the twentieth century, the Kurdish movement has merely
depended on the press in exile to publicize their publications. Further, the Kurdish
movement’s journals did not have much reach out. For instance, the Kurdish journals
in Sweden was only able to have a circulation of less than one thousand reader. Both
the publications and the speeches made by Ocalan (before his capture) were rarely in
the Kurdish language but rather in Turkish. Moreover, with the development of the
Satellite Television stations MED-TV, the Kurdish movement was able to utilize such
medium to have a relatively wider reach out. It was able to circulate much information
on the movement from these stations in Europe, away from the Turkey’s Official media
they are banned of. These independent stations and particularly the MED-TV was
operating in different countries in the MENA region and in Europe. However, at the
time of Ocalan’s arrest in 1999, several movement’s leaders instigated for violent
operations against the Turkish state. This resulted in the Independent Television
Commission to decide the suspension, the calling off the MED-TV and further to
dismiss their license to operate. Accordingly, the Kurdish movement turned to the
usage of internet as an alternative to the satellite Television. It created different Kurdish
websites by which it was able to spread a wider range of different types of information.
It circulated various journalistic and academic articles, Kurdish music, historical
displayed information on the Kurds and the Kurdish movement and even further their
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political propaganda through the internet. Though, this did not result in gaining much
attention from the international community but resulted in increasing the intensity of
the repressive measures by the Turkish state through destructing various Kurdish
villages. (Sinclair & Smets, 2014)
In addition, the Kurdish movement could not widen their popular support in Turkey as
the Zapatistas. As outlined earlier, the Zapatista movement could win the support
different societal sectors within Mexico and found common stations between itself and
other movements and groups within Mexico. On the contrary, the Kurdish movement
outcasted in 1978 any other Kurdish political groups away from the movement or from
the PKK (its military wing), and further in 1991 it forcibly dominated the legal Kurdish
parties either through intimidation or threatful propaganda. The Kurdish movement
throughout its struggle, has also aimed to win the support of the Kurds only. It was not
concerned to win the support of other Turkish societal groups. It changed its ideology
over the time, but in a way that attracted different factions of the Kurdish masses and
not any others. This is although it had a Marxist-Leninist core that might help in
constructing a wider base of national and international support. Despite all this, the
Kurdish movement’s tactics were not only attacked internationally or by the Turkish
government, but by the Kurdish communities within Tukey themselves. This is because
the movement has for several years launched violence and brutality against the
civilians. It sought selective violence against the regions that refuse to support the
movement and attacked their families causing enormous numbers of deaths. Thus, the
movement has disrupted a lot of Kurds living in Turkey and other Kurdish groups and
parties. The Kurdish movement was able through diaspora to establish different
Kurdish associations in different countries as pinpointed but failed to win the
international sympathy or the national backing of other factions within Turkey. It
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however, built a national base of network through intimidation and threatful techniques
rather than collaboration and support. (Davis et al, 2012)
The Kurdish movement has faced another issue regard its ability to pursue
transnationalism. It encountered an existent competition between itself and other
Kurdish movements in the MENA region. Each movement was targeting a set of
supporters through by which it guarantees a flow of resources and assistance. The
Kurdish movement in Turkey is not the only movement that aims to fight for the
Kurdish rights, especially that the Kurdish groups are dispersed geographically in
multiple states and each has its own propaganda. Thus, such competition led to
radicalize the Kurdish movement in Turkey and has evolved a lot of grievances within
the dispersed Kurdish movements and communities. This means that the Kurdish
movement in Turkey was not even able to link itself to other Kurdish movements in the
region. Therefore, the Kurdish movement was not neither united nor able to win the
support of its own community through its fight with the Turkish state. (O’Connor,
2014)
In all, the Kurdish movement in Turkey unlike the Zapatista movement, was not able
to establish a fast and wide-scoped transnational networks and popular support at the
beginning of the struggle. Not only that, but it could not effectively display itself in the
media nor to link its goals and concerns to other movements and organizations
elsewhere. However, it was able through the diasporas to construct different
associations and exert Kurdish lobbying in various European countries. This might have
relatively grasped the attention of the international community yet was not efficient to
change the outcomes nor to win the direct or indirect support through them.
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4.1.3 The Polisario Front & Transnationalism and Popular support

The Polisario front’s transnationalism and popular support was the least of the three
rebel movements in terms of its outcomes and reach out compared to the other two
movements. There was not a coherent strategy neither at the beginning nor through the
struggle. Though, it was able to construct some transnational networks, but its existence
in the national and international media is very limited. Not only that, it was not also
able to have diasporas like the Kurdish movement which made its popular support and
transnational networks much more fragile.

4.1.3.1 Its strategy & Analysis

The Polisario front conflicts with the Moroccan government and specifically since the
mid-1970s had resulted in the displacement of Sahrawis from the Western Saharan
region to various refugee camps in Tindouf in Algeria. (Mundy, 2006) This has not only
enabled the large physical existence and control of the Moroccan state of most of the
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Western Saharan region, but to limit the Saharawis from staying and defending their
territory. In other words, unlike the Zapatista movement, the Polisario Front was unable
to invite international actors to Western Sahara or grasp the attention to the conflicted
territory.
In regardless of this, the Polisario front sought through the SADR to establish widescoped networks between the refugee camps and various governmental institutions
around the globe. It was able to win an international judicial recognition for the SADR
and by the early 1989s 50 states recognized the SADR as the legitimate political
representation to the Sahrawi people either inside or outside the Western Sahara region.
This means that the Polisario front was granted a “Judicial sovereignty” by almost the
third of the UN member states. (Bank & Heur, 2007) This might seem to exceed the
achievements of both movements out of their transnationalism activities. But this is not
the case because most of the 50 states were former colonies in Africa, Latin America,
and some from the Middle East. The recognition did not involve any states from the
“First world” states. This in turn deteriorated the constant flow of resources and the
political support the movement needed especially at times of Western Sahara conflict’s
discussion in the UN security council. This is because that many resolutions in the
movement’s favor were vetoed against by countries like France and US. Moreover,
while the Polisario front failed to achieve any settlement for decades, some states
recalled their recognition. This does not mean that the Polisario front was not able to
construct several bases of networks. It was able to get several aid programs from
regional organizations like the OAU, and from different states but for limited periods
like Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Iran. Though, this assistance as outlined was not long
enough nor consistent.
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The Polisario front has also tried to build transnational networks with non-state actors.
It targeted several human rights NGOs, Western support communities and even
multiple political activists. It aimed to grasp the attention of the international arena
through their publications and their role as media influencers. However, this was not
neither efficient enough especially unlike the Kurdish movement, there was almost a
non-existent of the diaspora for the Sahrawis in the west. This was due to the very
small population of the Saharawi people in general, and that almost all of them live in
the refugee camps in Algeria since 1970s. Therefore, the awareness campaigns
launched for the Polisario front and the Saharawi people were leaded by non-Sahrawis,
which made them either overstated or understated rather than discussing the real
dynamics of the conflict. (ibid., 2007)
Thus, as elaborated above, the Polisario Front aimed for winning the international
support mainly through international recognition. On one hand, it was able to obtain a
widespread international recognition for either the movement or for their goals of selfdetermination. It was backed and assisted by several states like Algeria that
encompassed its refugee camps and handed over a lot of financial assistance and aid
programs. It depended on the international law of being on its side to further expand its
transnationalism strategies to foster the international diplomacy. Despite all of that, this
international support the movement won from different international institutions was
not efficient nor concrete to help the movement to attain its goals or to reach out any
possible settlement with the Moroccan state. The ICJ for instance, does not own any
enforcing mechanism over the Moroccan state, neither do the different international
institutions or the human rights organizations. Moreover, the movement tried to raise
the global awareness of the conflict and the situation of the Sahrawis through organizing
large marathons in the camps and hosting film festivals etc., but this has not
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strengthened the support base of the movement nor was able to exert pressure over the
Moroccan government to seek settlements. Additionally, the supporters whom the
Polisario Front leaned on for decades like Algeria, retreated from supporting it directly
in its armed conflict with Morocco. (Miller, 2014)
The Polisario Front with the technological advances in the media like the cellular phone,
the internet and the Satellite televisions attempted to reestablish a wider base of support
compared to the previous period. It was expected that these technological advancements
will enable the Polisario Front to circulate the information more efficiently about its
struggle and the present situation. Not only that, but to construct new channels of
communication and networks. However, this was not the case for various reasons. The
Moroccan monarchy has exerted enormous pressure over the Polisario Front to limit
the movement’s and the Sahrawis access to the media. The Moroccan government had
multiply blocked and halted their access to public telephones and interrupted their
signals of the radio stations and broadcasts. This made the circulation of the Polisario
Front’s news way harder. Though, it is important to outline that the Western Sahara
conflict enjoyed limited and intermittent coverage by other global channels like the
British Broadcasting company (BBC). (Deubel, 2015)
The technological advances allowed for building relationships between the Polisario
front and several NGOs or activist groups, though they were weak. The Polisario
Front’s activist groups like the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders was
able to establish transnational networks with foreign based non-profit organizations like
Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara and Sandblast. These networks
were possible and established through different web linkages and the new social media
such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Furthermore, these advances assisted the
movement to construct new ways of connections with several international advocates
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of human rights and development aid as well. As a result, the Polisario front could
work on the linkages with various Spanish NGOs which historically helped in providing
aid programs to the Sahrawi refugees. Furthermore, it sought to prepare with the support
of such networks huge festivals for displaying Sahrawis arts and culture in different
countries like the three-day festival held in London in 2007. Though, the positive
influence of these technological advances over the movement’s transnationalism was
multiply blocked and combatted. For instance, one of the important Polisario’s media
agencies- Equipe Media- which stressed on spreading information and news through
Facebook and direct emails from 2009 to 2013, got hacked multiples times. This
blocking and hacking operations continued until the agency decided to change the host
server to operate from Algeria in 2014. Not only that, but the movement’s festivals did
not yield any outcomes beyond winning the sponsorship of different NGOs to them.
(ibid, 2007)

In all, the development of media technologies may have immensely assisted the
movement to increase its mediums by which it can raise awareness through. Though,
the continuous restrictions and blockage enforced over the Western Sahara’s press and
broadcast media has limited its benefits or its reach out. Not only that, but the failure of
the movement to win a strong base of supporters away from the international
institutions that suffer from the absence of any enforcing mechanisms, led to a huge
international ignorance to the conflict and the situation in Western Sahara. Moreover,
the movement has also lacked to pursue its presence in the international media neither
at the beginning of the struggle as the Zapatista for example nor throughout the struggle.
This all might have negatively affected the communication among the Sahrawis and
facilitates the documentation of events. Thus, the Polisario front was internationally
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ignored and its conflict that has spanned for decades is much neglected from the
international arena or the international media. It was not able to win regional allies
other than Algeria, nor strong international allies. In other words, the Polisario front
merely reckoned on the international legal and diplomatic values to win its sovereignty
rather than following the tactical methods of the Zapatista. This shows that, it paid less
attention and was inefficient to enlarge its base of networks and gain the support of
strong allies to put enough pressure over the Moroccan government which was backed
by several first world states like France and US. It might have won the legitimization
of their goals from the international community like in 1975 by the ICJ but at the same
time was listed as the “forgotten conflict” for decades now due to its stalemate.
I need to point out that despite that the reasons of ignoring the Western Sahara’s conflict
in the international community and in international media are beyond the scope of my
thesis, but they are of a huge importance for better understanding of the conflict.

4.2 External Intervention

External intervention is one of the variables that I think it might have affected the
outcomes of the three rebel movements under the study. But before discussing it and
test its relevance to be considered one of the causal mechanisms that yielded such
divergent outcomes between the three rebel movements, it is important to outline its
conceptual meaning in the literature.
As outlined in Chapter 2, external intervention in fact has so many types and effects.
There is no agreed definition in all the academics to this concept; however, it is possible
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to display its certain features. Intervention in general and according to Ted Robert Gurr
in his paper of “Third party intervention in Ethnic conflicts”, may take the form of either
giving assistance, withdrawing it or to changing the status and the kind of relationships
exist between the state and the society. It also may result in changing the prospects of
the ongoing conflict. External intervention may use different strategies. Military action
is not the sole tool used as a strategy, but there are other tools like the economic
sanctions or financial assistance for instance. Hence, external intervention may use both
tools as a mixed strategy combining the economic punishment along with the military
interference. The intervention can also be carried out by major powers unilaterally,
through a multilateral action of group of countries, or an international organization such
as the UN. Moreover, external intervention may take sides, or it can be neutral with the
aim to get the conflicting parties at the table of negotiations and display possible
settlements. (Gurr,2004) Furthermore, and also as elaborated in Chapter 2, the literature
outlined that the early external intervention in favor of either the rebel movement or the
state, may lead either to decisive victory to the state or to prolonging of the armed
conflict rather than granting the rebel movement their targeted goal, which is for my
cases, territorial autonomy. Therefore, it is very crucial to differentiate the political
pressure or support that results from the external intervention and that from the
transnationalism and popular support. External intervention involves states or
governmental international institutions like the UN for example. However,
transnationalism and popular support involves the global and the national civil
societies.
Thus, based on what is elaborated above, I will tackle each rebel movement and test the
existence and the influence of any external intervention carried out by either a state (s)
or an international institution(s) throughout the duration of the conflicts.
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4.2.1 The Zapatista movement & External Intervention

The Zapatista movement, in its conflict with the Mexican state did not encounter any
form of external intervention neither from a state or group of states nor from an
international institution. However, the role of transnationalism explained earlier were
decisive in its social netwar against the Mexican state. In other words, the Zapatista
movement relied on the transnational NGOs mobilization and the political pressure they
enforce over the Mexican state. Its media propaganda allowed for grasping many US.
and Canadian activist NGOS that supported the movement and motivated other NGOs
to back it up. This has further enabled the movement to develop a highly and dense
network of different NGOs and other human right and indigenous rights movements.
These delegations along with wide array of journalists and media companies who were
welcomed in Chiapas to cover the incidents, enhanced the political position of the
movement. This has allowed the movement to organize several demonstrations,
marches, and peace caravans in Mexico and even in front the Mexican consulates in
United States for example. Thus, this intertwined network between the movement and
the various NGOs and organizations kept the conflict in the international media and
enabled the movement to widely display its views and stances. Consequently, the
Mexican state was under severe political pressure to defend its violent actions and its
prospects regards its domestic issues with the Zapatista movement. This is especially
that the movement could build a strong linkage of goals and demands that surpass the
national borders of several states, and that have won the international attention and
support. These goals were mainly the enforcement of democratic values through non-
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violent means, respect for human rights and the cease fire procedures. (Ronfeldt
&Arquilla, 2001)
So, as pointed out above, there was not any external intervention either from a state,
group of states or even from any international organizations to support any of the
conflicting parties or to act as mediators. Instead, after the insurgency held in January
1994, as outlined earlier, the government bureaucrats stepped forward as mediators and
created the “Congress Peace Commission” (COCOPA) through which they commenced
the peace process with the Zapatistas. This process started in 1995 and lasted for 10
months, which has resulted in identifying the demands and possible settlements and in
signing the “San Andrea Agreement” in 1996.

Despite that this peace process has

halted some time in 1996 but was resumed. This is due to the effectiveness of the
Zapatista movement to hold very wide-scoped conferences in Chiapas and Europe, and
the ability to win the international support, unlike the Mexican state. (Arman, 2013)
In all, the Zapatista movement did not encounter any external intervention that might
be responsible to any of imbalances occurred to the existent balance of power between
the conflicting parties. While the Mexican state owned a mighty military force and
financial resources compared to the movement’s, the movement reigned a huge
favorable presence in the international community, the international media, and
established wider support base from different NGOs and movements. This in turn
assisted much to achieve its territorial autonomy especially after the huge transnational
influence it succeeded to achieve and maintain.

4.2.2 The Kurdish movement & External Intervention
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On the other hand, the Kurdish movement and its conflict with the Turkish state
involved several external interventions which interrupted the balance of power that
would have existed without them. Along the years of conflict, there were several
external interventions and changes to it in terms of its degree and influence, which unlike the Zapatista case-halted any possible political settlement between the two
conflicting parties.
The Kurdish movement enjoyed several international backings away from the diasporas
or the transnational networks explained earlier. At the first period of the Kurdish
movement development, it enjoyed several regional states support. Like for example,
during its insurgency in 1984 till 1999, the Syrian government allowed for holding the
movement’s main camps in Syria and in the Syrian Bekaa Valley. Similarly, both the
Iraqi and the Iranian states assisted the Kurdish movement in constructing camps for its
military wing (PKK) on their lands. These camps were considered as safe havens for
the movement during the armed conflict with the Turkish army. (Bacik & Coskun,
2011)
The Kurdish movement was supported in different schemes, it was helped in its
recruitment processes, training, and given financial support. Not only that, but these
states allowed the PKK’s activities and functionality to be operated directly or indirectly
from their territories. Thus, the Kurdish movement flow of military, financial and
logistic assistance was constant for a long period from Syria and Iran. Moreover, at
different time periods of the conflict between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish
state, several states like the Soviet Union, Cyprus, Greece, Armenia, Libya, Bulgaria,
and Cuba provided direct logistical upholding to the Kurdish movement. For example,
Greece was able to support the Kurdish movement in Turkey by enhancing their
militants’ political and military training and by launching fundraising campaigns to
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promote it financially. The Greek intervention was also in terms of its pressure exerted
over the European Union to endorse the Kurdish independence from Turkey and
establish multiple governmental organizations that provide the latent political support
that the movement might be in need of. Likewise, the Soviet Union (and later Russia)
in specific, has legitimized the Kurdish movement and listed it as “the leader of the
Kurdish national democratic struggle. It did not only officially announce its alliance to
the Kurdish movement but implicitly backed the Kurdish uprisings in the 1920s against
Turkey. It has also equipped the movement with the needed training, resources (both
financially and militarily) and built camps for the movement in Moscow. In addition
to this, Iraq and particularly northern Iraq allowed for the physical presence of the
movement in its borders as well, by which it enabled to launch attacks against the
Turkish state. Iran from another perspective channeled the transferred weapons and
funds from Iraq and announced the Kurdish movement in Turkey as an ally. It opposed
and prevented the Turkish armed forces from tracing the PKK militants existing in its
borders. Furthermore, Armenia did not only militarily, financially, and politically
supported the Kurdish movement in Turkey but signed a joint action plan against
Turkey in Lebanon (Karaca, 2010)
However, these external interventions in favor of the Kurdish movement encountered
several issues. For instance, the Syrian assistance faced a cut off in 1998, when Turkey
moved mass troops along its borders with Syria. Similarly, the Iranian support shrank
when a security cooperation agreement was signed between Turkey and Iran in 2004.
(ibid, 2010) Though, the bases of the Kurdish movement that were developed in several
states in the region, altered the balance of power and enabled the launch of different
operations and attacks into Turkey.
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In all, all these states and their external interventions permitted to enhance the political
power of the Kurdish movement against the Turkish state in terms of accommodation,
weapons, ammunitions, camps and other logistics and sustenance.
Though, the balance of power was changed again with several political developments
and other external interventions that led to the conflict’s stalemate. At first, the Turkish
state has constantly pressured the European Union and the US to outlaw the PKK. And
this has resulted in the Kurdish movement particularly the PKK getting listed by the
European Union as a terrorist organization in 2002 and by the US in 2004. Furthermore,
the Turkish government was able to change the political stance of the US towards the
Kurdish conflict in general and in Turkey in particular. This is especially that the
Turkish state has accomplished much economically and strategically. Thus, the United
states in 2008 officially announced that the Kurdish movement in Turkey and
specifically the PKK is a “Common enemy” between it and Turkey. Accordingly, the
US and the Turkish leaders declared official statements against the PKK and there were
US authorized delegations assigned to handle and combat the PKK. Not only that, but
the US empowered the Turkish government with the technological and communications
facilities by which it can easily monitor and launch attacks over the PKK targets.
(Efegil, 2008) Similarly, the Turkish state was able to enforce much pressure over the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq to assist in resisting and restricting the
PKK activities. The KRG found a huge relevance to turn over the PKK especially that
it might be able to increase its economic benefits through the Turkish-KRG ties and get
rid of the PKK’s intimidation to its economic order. Thus, Turkey along with the US
and the KRG constructed the anti-PKK block in the region. Moreover, this anti-PKK
block has widened and encompassed more states that started to perceive the Kurdish
movement in Turkey as a threat and an issue, like Iran and Syria. This is because the
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Kurdish movement in Turkey was interlinked with several Kurdish groups both in Iran
and Syria that threatened their national security. Iran was on one hand threatened by the
PJAK (The Party for Free Life in Kurdistan) which was supported by the PKK and was
able to stand against the Iranian troops. Syria faced similar threats to its national
security and its domestic order from the PKK. Therefore, this has aroused Syria to
implement several law enforcements measures that embargoed the Kurdish movement
in the country specifically the PKK, launched attacks against the PKK bases and
imprisoned the PKK militants. (ibid, 2011)
In all, these external interventions of several states in the MENA region and worldwide
was mainly because of perceiving the Kurdish movement in Turkey as a source of threat
and instability to the region. This in turn has fostered the trade relations with the Turkish
state and might have relatively changed the balance of power in its favor both politically
and economically.

In short, as elaborated above, the external intervention was existent at the very
beginning of the movement’s struggle from different states, which has not only
prolonged the armed struggle but triggered the Turkish state to seek a counterintervention as well that resulted in the conflict’s stalemate, without decisive victory to
any of the conflicting parties. This stalemate is still considered a failure to the Kurdish
movement because my measure of success is attaining territorial autonomy which was
not achieved till today.
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4.2.3 The Polisario Front & External Intervention

Throughout the Polisario front’s conflict with the Moroccan state, there were several kinds and
degrees of external interventions like the Kurdish movement. This has largely influenced the
prospects of the struggle, especially that as discussed earlier, the Polisario Front was not able to
establish coherent transnational networks or effective popular support. Thus, it also unlike the
Zapatista movement, could not reach out to a political settlement and rather turned into a stalemate
like the Kurdish movement.
From one perspective, the intervention of the United Nations (UN) and the ICJ as international
institutions in favor of the Polisario Front was vivid and direct since the beginning of the struggle.
This was first in 1975 when the UN has intervened and sought arbitration from the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). The UN aimed to legally articulate which conflicting party has the right of
sovereignty over the Western Saharan region. The ICJ in turn has unanimously announced and
recognized the right of self-determination to the Polisario front and the Saharawis, which was
politically refused by Morocco. (Omar, 2008) Moreover, the UN has intervened again but this time
as a mediator to reach out a political resolution for the Western Saharan conflict. It headed and
mediated the negotiations between the Polisario Front and Morocco. That it assigned the United
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to handle referendum
procedures, and supervise the cease fire procedures, and the peace building measures. Not only
that, but the UNHCR and the UN World Food program have also furnished the Polisario front with
several aid programs to distribute it over the Saharawi refugees in the camps. (Seddon, 1987)
Additionally, the external intervention involved other international and regional institutions like

103

the OAU (the Organization of African Unity) besides the UN and the ICJ. The OAU has obscured
the military operations of the Moroccan state against the Polisario front by isolating it and has
endorsed the right for the self determination of the Polisario Front and Sahrawis. Not only that,
but the OAU pushed for the ratification of the peace treaty “The Algeris agreement “between the
Polisario front and Mauretania in 1979. This has positively enhanced the political position of the
Polisario front through further isolating Morocco. Moreover, it has officially legitimized the
Polisario Front by adding a seat to the SDAR in the OAU. This has further pressured Morocco to
announce its temporarily acceptance to the proposals of the controlled referendum. (Seddon, 1987)
Despite that these external interventions aimed to settle the conflict, neither the UN (with its
different bodies), the OAU nor the ICJ acquired the enforcing mechanism over Morocco. This
does not mean that their intervention did not affect the balance of power between the two
conflicting parties, but it meant that they might have added to the stalemate of the conflict. This is
because they were not able to compel Morocco to approve the referendum nor to allow the
Polisario Front to practice its right of self-determination.
The Polisario front has also witnessed other external interventions in its favor at the beginning of
its struggle. For example, it was backed militarily in its armed conflict against Morocco, primarily
by Algeria. It received sundry of military aids from Algeria, and to a lesser extent from Libya as
well. This is because of the political ties they established with the Polisario front against the
Moroccan monarchy. Both Algeria and Libya considered the Moroccan monarchy as a geopolitical
competitor in the region that follow a divergent ideology to theirs. Thus, Libya allowed for
fundamental financial assistance to Polisario front and Algeria backed the Polisario front with
mainly arms and weapons, and a physical base in its territory to reinforce the movement’s
capabilities against Morocco. The support base of the Polisario front either politically or
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diplomatically to include other regions of the world like the states of Haiti and Philippines which
further push the Moroccan government to seek settlements. (Pazzanita, 1994)
On the other hand, the Moroccan government sought support to outweigh the external intervention
carried out in favor of the Polisario Front. It was able to attain the backing of several permeant
members in the UN security Council like the US and France. They in turn assisted the Moroccan
political stance through vetoing the propositions set by the MINURSO and opposing to offer it any
further authorities that can compel Morocco to abide the UN agreements. Also, France opposed
the full ratification over the 2003 Baker’s Peace Plan or to compel Morocco to accept the
implementation of the referendum over the Western Saharan independence. Similarly, the US and
the UK supported Morocco’s position against the Polisario Front. They obstructed any changes to
the mandate of the MINURSO, which authorize the MINUSRO to monitor and halt any human
rights’ violations practiced by the Moroccan government against the Polisario Front. This is
especially that the disputed territory of the Western Sahara is under the UN supervision. (Zoubir,
2018) Furthermore, in 1985, the Moroccan government sought assistance from the World Bank
and was provided with a short-term loan of 200 million dollars despite the Moroccan enormous
economic crisis and its international debt (13 billion dollars). Likewise, the Moroccan government
won the support of the IMF as well to reinforce its economic situation and was provided with a
new stand-by loan of 250 million dollars. This had immensely fostered the military stance of the
Moroccan government and increase its expenditure to 1 billion dollars in five years. This is despite
of the 74 million dollars military assistance and the 66 million dollars development and food aid
handed over by the US to Morocco to counter its conflict with the Polisario Front in 1986. (Ibid,
1987)
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Moreover, the external intervention was also clear at the Moroccan state’s struggle with the
Polisario Front over the natural resources in Western Sahara region. Morocco, on one hand, sought
to utilize these natural resources for its economic advantages and further signed several contracts
with foreign companies for their extraction. The Polisario Front has rejected such contracts and
claimed of their illegality. From one perspective, the UN has again supported the political stance
of the Polisario Front under Secretary General for Legal Affairs and officially announced the
illegality of such contracts. From another perspective, the EU has signed multiple agreements with
Morocco over these natural resources that allow for fishing activities by the EU vessels in the
entire coast of Morocco and in the dispute territory of Western Sahara as well. In consequence, the
SADR of the Polisario front signed contracts with Australian companies for extractions as well
and ratified nine other contracts with various oil companies for explorations. (Miller, 2014)
In 2000, the external intervention in favor of Morocco was reinforced. The Morocco’s political
and economic situation was consolidated with the EU assistance as elaborated above and with the
other governments and international institutions’ support as well. The EU and Morocco on one
hand issued an Action Plan under the EU’s Neighborhood Policy, which largely influenced their
economic, political, and social alliances. The US provided an aid of about 41.2 million dollars to
Morocco in 2012, because of the FTA agreement signed in 2004. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is also
considered one of the important supporters to Morocco against its conflict with the Polisario Front.
Although, it kept low profile towards its support to Morocco, but it constantly provided Morocco
with an aid of around 200 to 500 million dollars annually. (Strachan, 2014)
Despite this enormous external intervention in favor to the Moroccan side, the cost of the armed
conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front is rather high. This left the conflict with no
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decisive victory to either sides, especially that the Polisario Front was backed by several external
interventions as well.

In all, the Polisario front was backed by various international institutions like the ICJ and the UN
which issued various rulings and resolutions in favor of the movement since the very beginning of
the struggle. This might have added much to the movement’s legitimacy, credibility and to its
power authorities. However, this support was outweighed by more powerful and constant support
from different first world countries that obstructed any of the resolutions or the implementation of
the rulings that might harm Moroccan political aims. As a result, this has all added to imbalance
of the power dynamics between the Polisario Front and Morocco. Therefore, the Polisario Front
like the Kurdish movement encountered an early external intervention in its favor from the ICJ,
the UN and Algeria, which has triggered Morocco to seek counter external intervention from
several states and international institutions as well. This in turn did not only prolong the conflict
but added further complications to the conflict and resulted in its stalemate.

4.3 Level of Democracy within the states

The level of democracy and the implementation of the democratic values are one of the thesis’s
hypotheses. I argued that this hypothesis contributes to the causal mechanism that resulted in the
divergent outcomes of the three rebel movements under study. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the
literature has endorsed this hypothesis, and showed that the type of the state affects immensely the
dynamics of the conflict and the outcomes of the rebel movements. This is because the level of
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democracy of the state determines the state’s reaction towards the rebel movement and the conflict,
and also the state’s reaction towards transnationalism and base of support. For instance, democratic
states tend to adopt tolerant measures to deal with the rebel movements and their demands or
contentious politics. Unlike the authoritarian states that tend to use coercive and violent methods.
In other words, the effectiveness of the rebel movements is higher in the democratic states and
usually yield the intended outcomes, unlike the authoritarian states. However, it is still crucial to
articulate that there are different levels of each state type like democracy which can range from
the transition phase of democratization and procedural democracy to participatory democracy.
Thus, after the brief elaboration on the third hypothesis, I will test its relevance as a causal
mechanism comparatively in the following paragraphs through discussing the level of democracy
in the three conflicting states under study.

4.3.1 Mexico

The Mexican state prior to the development of the Zapatista movement, was ruled by the PRI party.
The PRI party ruled Mexico for around 71 years, by which the presidential candidates were
selected by the incumbent president. Not only that, but the PRI ensured a smooth hand over of the
political authority through electoral frauds, when required. Moreover, the presidency overruled the
judicial and legislative branches which did not allow for the separations of powers and the pursuit
of checks and balances. The civil society in Mexico was also coopted into state-governed
organizations and was not able to develop coherent opposition parties until almost 1978. (Gilberth
& Otero, 2001) Later, the ruling party of the PRI sought democratic transition in terms of
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implementing the electoral democracy and pursuing free-market and neoliberal reforms. This was
first when Mexican government has enforced the agrarian counter-reform in 1991 which altered
the policies set for land redistribution and allowed for privatization of the collectively owned lands.
Then, when it enforced the NAFTA agreement in 1994. Accordingly, the Mexican state aimed to
abide by the agreements’ set of rules and aimed not lose its national and international legitimacy.
It by then pursued an electoral reform that permitted the legal registration of other political parties.
(Collins, 2010)
Hence, before the 1994 insurgency, the political system of Mexico exercised the electoral form of
democracy or the procedural democracy. However, the loopholes of this democracy were unfolded
nationally and internationally at the eruption of the Zapatista movement. This in turn has triggered
the Mexican government to take further reforms. It first pushed for the resignation of the interior
minister and former governor of Chiapas. It authorized another electoral reform that compelled the
Mexican government to allow for international and civic observers to monitor the presidential
elections. Moreover, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) turned into an independent body that is
governed by nonpartisan citizens and not by the Mexican government itself. These political
reforms resulted in various outcomes. For example, the opposition was able to win the political
power of the Lower House of Congress in the midterm election in 1997 midterm elections. Also,
that the Mexican government assigned Manuel Camacho Solis as the peace commissioner and
called for instant negotiations with the Zapatista movement within the same month of the uprising.
Moreover, the Mexican government has even developed a unilateral cease-fire procedure.
(Klesner,1998).
Though, these political steps undertaken by the Mexican government may fastened the
democratization process of Mexico but did not fully democratize Mexico. Until before 2000, it
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was still listed as a semi-democratic political system, especially with the continuity of relatively
practicing electoral fraud. Also, the monopoly of executive power by the PRI for over than 70
years, accompanied by the bad record on human rights and the rule of law. The Mexican
government exercised repressive measures as a form of low-intensity warfare in parallel to its
peace negotiations with the Zapatista movement. (Otero ,2001) In addition to this, the Freedom
house of index showed that Mexico is considered as “partly free” at the time period of 1994 till
before the 2000s. It has scored ‘4’ in the political rights category and ‘4’ in the civil liberties
category. (Freedom House index, 1990 &1994)4
However, the political system of Mexico has largely changed in the 2000s. This is mainly because
the victory of the opposition party (PAN party) and its president Vicente Fox in the 2000 primary
elections. This has pushed the Mexican state further in its democratization path of Mexico and
reinforced the changes in its political system. Not only that, but Fox has pushed for setting the
Zapatista’s conflict resolution as a priority in the 2001 political agenda, which accelerated granting
the Zapatista movement their territorial autonomy. (ibid ,2001) The Freedom House index showed
that the Mexican state was listed as “free” state in 2000 and scored ‘2’ in the political rights
category and ‘3” in the civil liberties category. (Freedom House index, 2000)

Thus, as elaborated above, at the beginning of the struggle, the Mexican state was listed as “partly
free” especially after the implementation of NAFTA. This is because such agreement compelled
Mexico to apply liberal economic and political policies in several aspects, and to political openings

4

The Freedom House Index applies seven points scale to each of the categories (ie, the political rights & civil
liberties categories). By which, (1) is the freest and (7) is the least free. No state is considered totally free or unfree,
but it can be judged that the state’s score of (1) is better or considered freer than its score of (2).
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and the protection of human and civil rights. However, by 2000s, Mexico was listed as “free” state
with high scores on both the political rights and civil liberties categories.

4.3.2 Turkey

The Turkish state since its establishment and till the 2000s, its political system was structured
based on the hegemony of the military in politics or formatted by the National Security Council.
It witnessed several military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 to reformulate the Turkish
political system and outline its framework according to the Turkish national security. Despite that,
the relationship between the Turkish state and the Kurds in Turkey did not officially exist in the
agenda of the elected governments, but rather determined by the National Security Council in the
70s, 80s, and the 90 eras. Thus, the Turkish political system was dominated by the military and
the practice of repression over civil authorities through multiple military coups. Turkish politics
did not also enjoy the respect of general human rights, the rule of law nor even the freedom of
expression. These periods of coups promoted brutal and violent repressive tactics against the
Kurdish movement and the Kurds in general. In addition, at the beginning of the 2000’s, the state
of emergency procedure was still enforced by the Turkish state over the high dense Kurdish cities
in the east and the southeast of Turkey. The Turkish politics was featured of stressing the
importance of Turkish state nationalism and in turn exercised different forms of exclusionary
policies and restrictive assimilation towards the Kurds, especially after 1995. (Cakmak, 2014)
The violation of the human rights prospects against the Kurds were mainly in the 1980s after the
eruption of the Kurdish movement. The Turkish state turned to “Securitization of the Kurdish
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conflict”. This was even institutionalized in the 1982 constitution which officially banned the
usage of any other languages than the Turkish even in education. With the escalation of the Kurdish
guerrilla attacks within Turkey, the Turkish state commenced its usage of violent and repressive
strategies as well. It transferred its troops in the southeast and started the recruitment of village
guards to counter the PKK fighters in the region. Not only that, but the Turkish security forces
have exercised several brutal strategies ranging from evacuation of villages, displacements of
families, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and torture. In 1987, the Turkish state enforced
the emergency rule over ten provinces of the southeast. Moreover, the Turkish state has issued a
new anti-terrorism law in 1991, which legitimized a vast array of repressive activities to combat
terrorism. The Kurdish or the pro-Kurdish parties were completely embargoed. (Kaliber & Tocci,
2010) According to the Freedom House index, Turkey was listed as “not free” in 1978 and “partly
free” in 1994. (Freedom House index, 1978 & 1994)
However, by the late 1990s, the Turkish state’s political approach started slightly to change, which
in turn affected its relationship with the Kurdish movement and the stance of the Kurdish problem.
This change was due to the European Union’s democratic conditionality for membership through
the Copenhagen political criteria and because of the arrestment of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan
in 1999. Since then, and with the unilateral five years cease fire proposed by the PKK and the
evolution of the KCK, the Turkish state granted some rights to the Kurds like the right to broadcast,
and to accept the Kurdish language as a possible elective course in schools, abolishment of death
penalties and lifting the state of emergency. (Perthes, 2010) Not only that, but Turkey aimed to
democratize and apply political reform within its political system. It started with the amendments
to the constitution in 2001. Further, the Turkish parliament issued eight harmonization policies
between 2002 and 2004. These policies included the liberalization of political parties, press,
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allowed the broadcasting and education in other languages than the Turkish, increased the civilian
checks and balances over the military etc. The EU conditional approval of its candidacy fostered
such changes, and the democratization process. This period especially after the 2002 elections and
the AKP coming to power, allowed for Turkish liberalization and in turn for the “Kurdish opening”
phase (discussed earlier). In 2005, the Prime Minister and the AKP leader Tayyip Erdogan
opposed to the practiced assimilative state policies against the Kurds and the Kurdish movement
and allowed for a wider political space that engaged the Kurds. Accordingly, the new Turkish
political system restricted the veto power of the military and further released the Kurdish
politicians captured since the 1994. According to the Human Rights Association of Turkey, the
practice of violations to human rights’ figures were dwindling between 1999 and 2004, and there
was a substantial increase in the human rights situation in Turkey after such political reforms.
(Tezur, 2009)
According to the Freedom House index, Turkey was listed as “partly free” in the 2000s period. It
scored ‘4” in the political rights category and ‘5’ in the civil liberties category. (Freedom House
index, 2000) This means that the changes discussed above in the Turkish political system, changed
Turkey’s categorization from “not free” state to “a “partly free” state.

Since 2009, the internal dynamics has changed back, and forth which affected the level of
democracy and rule of law in Turkey and also the relationship between the Kurdish movement and
the Turkish state especially in 2014. At the beginning of 2009, there were positive anticipation that
the relationship between the Turkish state and the Kurdish movement will be settled in a way.
Especially that even though the commenced Kurdish peace process by Justice and Development
Party (AKP) government -which is also known as the Kurdish opening or the resolution processfailed at the beginning but was rebooted in 2012-2013. This is because the Kurdish peace pacts
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were later strongly supported by the government especially with the rising prospects of
autonomous Kurdish region in the neighboring countries and the rising number of causalities as
well. Not only that, but the Turkish government has also carried out many rounds of informal
peace negotiations with the PKK leadership and pro-Kurdish parties like the BDP (Peace and
Democracy Party). This resulted in further reforms to the peace pacts introduced earlier, ending
the armed conflict, and in enforcing an indefinite cease fire resolution. In return, the Turkish state
halted their operations in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, and by then the anticipation of a
probable settlement of the Kurdish problem in Turkey has risen.

(Aydin, Keyman, & Duzgit,

2017)

However, there had been a severe drift in the political actions of the Turkish government mainly
in 2014 especially with the growing strategic importance and authority of the YPG and the KRG.
Turkey has been targeting the movement’s bases in Iraq. Not only that, but it has suppressed
violently the huge Kurdish protests within the Turkish borders that had taken place as an objection
to the Turkish government’s actions. This resulted to have the police, killing around 30 Kurdish
citizens in the southeast provinces, Ankara, and Istanbul. Not only that, but the Turkish forces
targeted the movement’s members in Hakkari in 2014 As a result, the PKK carried out several
revenge attacks against Turkish police officers. The relationship got more hostile in 2015 and that
is mainly because of Turkey’s priorities in its foreign policy (Derisotis, 2019)

Besides the resumption of the armed conflict, these political changes produced electoral tensions
between the HDP and AKP. The HDP-AKP relation worsened in June 2015, when the AKP has
failed for the first time to attain the majority vote since 2002 vis a vis the pro-Kurdish party HDP
(the leftwing People’s Democratic Party). This has led to the automatic and complete termination
of the peace pact processes from the government side. Moreover, the AKP had declared that there
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is not anymore, a Kurdish problem in Turkey and that the Kurds will not get any more political
rights. Since then, Turkey has been witnessing a more intensified and deadly resumed armed
conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurdish movement. While, the PKK has
launched several attacks against Turkish soldiers and police officers, the Turkish state targeted and
arrested many of HDP’s members. Moreover, there have been several suicide bombings that
resulted in 104 people been killed and in return several Turkish air strikes against PKK’s bases.
(ibid, 2019) Hence, the Turkish political system backslided and did not only terminate the peace
process in 2015 but resumed the securitization practices against the Kurds similar to the period of
the military coups. (Novellis ,2018)
According to the Freedom House index, Turkey’s global freedom score has dwindled since 2009
from being “partly free”, until it was listed as “not free” in 2020. (Freedom House index, 2014,
2017, &2020)
Therefore, as outlined above, Turkey has witnessed back and forth changes in its level of
democracy. However, throughout the studied period, the level of democracy is considerably lower
than that of Mexico. Unlike Mexico, Turkey was multiply listed as “not free” state either at the
very beginning of the struggle or now.

4.3.3 Morocco

The Moroccan state was featured to have a repressive political system that blocked any political
access to many societal factions before the 1990s. However, since 1992, the Moroccan state has
witnessed several institutional reforms aiming to democratize or to undergo democratic transition.
115

This was mainly because it aimed to join the third wave of democratization. However, this
democratization prospects were consolidated in 1997 when the opposition socialist was ruling.
Since then, the government declared a political opening through decentralizing the power from the
central government, enlarging the political space, increasing the political participation, and issuing
new constitution that protects the human ana civil rights. It has also overthrown the national
information system and issued liberalizing press laws. Morocco was categorized as the most
democratic state in the Arab world especially after 1999 or at the post king Hassan II rule period.
(Ibahrine, 2002)
However, the Moroccan democratic transition faced mighty hurdles in terms of the limited
constraints on the socialist-led government and the resilience of the authoritarian cultural and
institutional frameworks. This transition may have allowed to push for exercising more civil and
political rights, but the Moroccan state was still able to dominate the government. For example,
the King was still able to appoint his loyalists in the government. In all, the power structure that
was developed before the 1990s, was resilient enough to continue at the democratic transition
phase. Moreover, the political system in Morocco was still ruled by a constitutional monarchy who
was able to dominate the political authority over the three branches of the government, the
legislative, executive, and judicial. Not only that, but the political system was still based on the
three principles, Islam, the Monarchy, and the territorial unity (and that include the Western
Saharan). Any deviations from these principles from a political party or group will result in its
banning from the political sphere. Hence, the monarch’s authority is supreme and is based on his
religious role as the “Commander of the Faithful” and the head of the state. (Abdel-Samad, 2014)
Moreover, this political openness in both the press freedom and the human rights were outweighed
with the use of legal and financial sanctions over criticisms to maintain order and legitimacy. The
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granted freedoms and political opening in Morocco might be a precedent compared to the Arab
states in the region but was constrained through different measures. For example, in 2011 and the
rage of the Arab revolts, the Moroccan state controlled its influence over the country through the
usage of “technologies of disconnection” to restrict the transfer of information and the cyber space.
Not only that, but it also blocked the websites and cyber attacked sites. These tactics were also
used against the Polisario Front to limit their reach out or transnational influence. The Moroccan
state has traced and targeted the members of Polisario front. Thus, the Moroccan state may have
encountered political and constitutional reforms throughout the history, but the with no effect or
restrictions over the monarch’s power, and with no real public space for the citizens away from
the government dominance. (Zaid, 2016) Accordingly, the Freedom House index scores showed
limited changes in the global freedom scores of Morocco before and after the implementation of
the democratization process. Morocco was still listed as “Partly Free” and scored ‘5’ and ‘4’ in
the political rights and civil liberties categories, respectively. (Freedom House index, 1994 &
2000-2001).
The Moroccan state has developed further constitution reforms in 2011 which illustrates that
Morocco’s system of governance will follow a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary, and
social monarchy framework. It articulates the existence of separation of powers and the citizenry
participation in the political sphere to foster accountability measures. However, this does not entail
any restrictions or limitation to the monarch authority like the British or the Spanish states. The
monarch is still authorized to appoint the government members, the Prime minister of the winning
party and to dissolve the parliament, etc. Accordingly, the Worldwide Governance indicator
developed by the World Bank Group outlined the achievement of the state in terms of freedom of
expression, political stability, absence of violence and the protection of rights, etc. Morocco has
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scored the lowest at the accountability, absence of violence and political stability. This ensures the
fact that the constitutional and institutional reforms undertaken by the Moroccan government did
not yield a fundamental push for the democratic transition process. Similarly, the Arab Democracy
Index that measures the process of democratic transition in the Arab countries pointed out that in
comparison between the institutional reforms and political practice, Morocco did not achieve any
improvements in its democratic transition phase since its start in 1999. (Benhlal, 2014) In addition
to this, the Freedom House index showed that Morocco was also listed as “Partly free” and has
also scored ‘5’ and ‘4’ in the political rights and civil liberties categories, in 2014, 2015, and 2017.
Thus, in all, the Moroccan state did not perform real reforms away from the expansion of powers
to the Prime Minister and to the Parliament when issuing legislative initiatives. This means that
there was no drastic change in the political system or the level of democracy since the 1999 till
today. Morocco might not get listed as “not free” like Turkey but was categorized as “partly free”
throughout the period under study.
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4.4 Discussion & Concluding remarks

The above examination of the three variables among the three rebel movements showed that the
proposed interactive model and the variables are of relevance. Not only that, but that the level of
democracy in particular might be an antecedent variable to the other two variables. The Zapatista
movement was the only rebel movement among the three cases studied that could attain territorial
autonomy. The causal mechanism for this could be explained through my interactive model which
suggests that the three variables - transnationalism and popular support, external intervention, and
level of democracy within the state- should exist and interact in a particular configuration and
sequence with the level of democracy being an antecedent variable, to attain the intended outcome.
The Zapatista case showed that the level of democracy seems to be not only an antecedent variable
but might be more significant than the other two variables. This is because the level of democracy
determined the state’s reaction towards the rebel movement and towards its strategies to seek
transnationalism and popular support. For example, the Mexican state at the early stages of the
struggle with the Zapatista movement -as discussed in Chapter 3- relied on coercive methods only.
However, this reaction has changed only after 12 days of the armed conflict, by which the Mexican
government sought a unilateral cease fire procedure and agreed to negotiate. Further, these
negotiations resulted in formulating the San Andreas Peace Accords which include the
movement’s demands of territorial autonomy (Ronfeldt et al., 1998) Thus, the change of the state’s
reaction and the short duration of using violence can be explained through its level of democracy.
This is mainly because at that time the Mexican state was “Partly free” and became sensitive to
human rights records and individual rights like freedom of expression since the implementation of
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NAFTA agreement. In other words, this agreement compelled Mexico to apply liberal economic
and political policies in several aspects, pursue political openings and guarantee the protection of
human and civil rights.
However, this change in the state’s reaction did not result in granting the Zapatista movement
territorial autonomy yet until only in 2001. This is because the level of democracy at the period
prior to 2001 (1994-2000) has only forced the Mexican state to halt its usage of violence but was
not high enough to force the state to implement the San Andreas peace accords. These accords
were only implemented in 2001, when the level of democracy got high and the Mexican state was
listed as a “free state”. The Freedom House index showed that the Mexican state was listed as
“free” state in 2000 and scored ‘2’ in the political rights category and ‘3” in the civil liberties
category. Therefore, political system of Mexico has largely changed after the victory of the
opposition party (PAN party) and its president Vicente Fox in the 2000 primary elections. This has
pushed the Mexican state further in its democratization path and reinforced the changes in its
political system. Not only that, but Fox has pushed for setting the Zapatista’s conflict resolution
as a priority in the 2001 political agenda, which accelerated granting the Zapatista movement their
territorial autonomy. (Otero ,2001).
Thus, the high level of democracy in the 2000s allowed for several political opportunities utilized
by the Zapatista movement in its favor. This is because that the Mexican state became sensitive to
the international community which enhanced the Zapatista movement’s political stance and
allowed for exerting much pressure over the Mexican government to attain its goals. In other
words, the high level of democracy within the Mexican state created political opportunities for the
Zapatista movement to pursue its territorial autonomy and restricted the Mexican government from
override or completely repress the Zapatista movement.
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The level of democracy has also affected the state’s reaction towards the movement’s strategies.
The Mexican relatively high level of democracy allowed the Zapatista movement to construct the
strong and necessary transnational networks and popular support since the very beginning of its
eruption. This might have not been accomplished if the Mexican government was at a lower level
of democracy. The Zapatista movement -unlike the other two movements- have not encountered
any bans or restrictions to the usage of media, or the internet to display their opinions and views.
Therefore, the two variables of level of democracy and transnationalism and popular support
interact together with the level of democracy being an antecedent variable.
However, a high level of democracy in itself might not result in attaining territorial autonomy.
This is because the Zapatista movement’s success should also be accounted -as discussed earlierto its ability to enlarge its transnational networks and widen its popular support either nationally
or internationally. Not only that, it did not also witness any early external interventions neither in
favor of the movement itself nor the state. Thus, these two variables interact together as well. That
because there were not any early external interventions to any of the conflicting parties, the only
effect over the existent balance of power was the influence of the transnational networks and the
popular support in favor of the Zapatista movement.
Thus, the Zapatista case shows that my interactive model could account for the causal mechanism
of my research question. It demonstrated that the level of democracy might be an antecedent
variable and of more significance but cannot alone result in the intended goals. This means that
the non-existence of any early external intervention accompanied by strong and coherent
transnational networks and popular support in a high-level democratic state can result in a rebel
movement attaining territorial autonomy.
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Likewise, both the Kurdish and Polisario Front can assure such claims. On one hand, Turkey has
witnessed low level of democracy compared to Mexico. It was either listed as “Partly free” or a
“not free” state throughout the period under study. This has negatively affected the state’s reaction
towards the Kurdish movement, and towards the movement’s strategies as well. Not only that, but
the Kurdish movement -as discussed earlier in the chapter- was not able to establish a fast and
wide-scoped transnational networks and popular support neither at the beginning or throughout
the struggle. Further, it could not effectively display itself in the media nor to link its goals and
concerns to other movements and organizations elsewhere. Moreover, it encountered early
external interventions which has not only prolonged the armed struggle but triggered the Turkish
state to seek a counter- intervention. This has in turn did not only resulted in the conflict’s
stalemate, without a decisive victory to any of the conflicting parties, but also in the resumption
of the armed conflict.
The Polisario Front similarly did not have high level of democracy throughout the period under
study and got listed as “Partly free” with very low scores of political rights and civil liberties. Not
only that, but it could not also establish strong transnational networks and popular support and has
experienced early external intervention in favor of the rebel movement. This intervention -like the
Kurdish case-triggered the Moroccan government to seek a counter intervention which resulted in
the stalemate of the conflict.
Therefore, based on the analysis displayed in Chapter 4. I propose that the three rebel movements
showed that the level of democracy might be an antecedent variable which influences first the
state’s reaction towards the rebel movement’s eruption and later to the movement’s transnational
networks and popular support. This does not mean that it is a sufficient variable but rather a
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necessary one. Not only that, but that transnationalism and popular support is also a necessary
variable that affects the balance of power in favor of the rebel movement, if there are not any early
external interventions. This is because the external intervention influences the dynamics of the
conflict through triggering counter intervention and by then the level of resolve. It prolongs the
armed conflict and reduce the probability of making concessions by any of the conflicting parties.
In other words, external intervention negatively affects the prospects of the rebel movement either
through prolonging the conflict or through freezing it, and according to my measure of success,
which is territorial autonomy, this is considered a failure.
Therefore, the three variables are not considered sufficient ones, but rather necessary ones that
interact to yield the intended outcomes. In other words, the causal mechanism cannot be explained
in 3x3 table, because the three variables should exist together in the particular sequence and
configuration discussed above. It is also important to outline that besides that the level of
democracy might be an antecedent variable, it seems to be endogenous to the whole process. It did
not only affect the outcomes of the movements but got affected by the movements as well. For
instance, while the Zapatista movement fostered the Mexican democratization process, the Kurdish
movement resulted in the backsliding of democracy over time in Turkey. In all, the three case
studies endorsed my proposition that the causal mechanism to my research question is explained
through an interactive model of three variables that exist and interact in a particular configuration
and sequence.
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Chapter V. Conclusion

The thesis’s main aim was to answer the puzzle of why despite that the territorial autonomy is
largely discussed in the literature as an effective conflict management mechanism for various
ethnopolitical wars is attained by some rebel movements and not others. Therefore, this thesis
sought to answer the question of why some rebel movements attain territorial autonomy while
others do not? I hypothesized that there are three factors that might affect the dynamics of the rebel
movements and explain this research question. These are the extent of transnationalism and
popular support of the movement, external intervention, and the level of democracy within the
state.
I further assumed that the interaction of the three variables in a particular configuration and
sequence can explain the divergent outcomes. In other words, I propose that it is crucial to go
beyond the existing literature that explain the outcomes of the rebel movements through one or
more variables and use an interactive model to seek an accurate causal mechanism. This is because
when I referred to the literature that examined my research question, I found that the displayed
main theoretical approaches (the political opportunity structure approach and the type of the
existent political system, the resource mobilization approach, and the strategies used) fell short to
demonstrate the divergent outcomes of the cases studies. On one hand, the three rebel movements
have utilized violent and non-violent strategies at least at one phase of their struggle. Also, the
Zapatista movement acquired the least resources either financially or militarily compared to the
other two movements but was the only one that could attain territorial autonomy (not as suggested
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by the resource mobilization approach). Not only that, but the three states were at the
democratization phase and they all suppressed the rebel movements at least at one stage of the
conflict. Thus, I hypothesized that the thesis’s interactive model will reinforce the assumption that
the three variables may not solely have a direct impact for yielding the outcomes, but that the rebel
movements are influenced by them all. In other words, my model suggested that it is not about an
existing or non-existing variable, but rather a configuration of three variables that exist in a
particular sequence that yielded such divergent outcomes in the cases under discussion.
These assumptions were tested and examined through three case studies which are the Zapatista
movement in Mexico, the Kurdish movement in Turkey and the Polisario Front in Morocco. This
is because While territorial autonomy was relatively attained by the Zapatista movement, the
Kurdish movement has been listed as a terrorist organization and the Polisario Front is outlawed
in Morocco. I referred to the crucial historical events in each rebel movement to articulate the
common stations and points of comparison and present evidence on the three movements from the
existing secondary literature using “Process tracing method. This has helped me to point out that
the Zapatista movement was able to attain territorial autonomy -my measure of success-, while the
other two movements did not. Not only that, but the Zapatista movement was the shortest in
duration and has only engaged in an armed conflict for 12 days, compared to the other two
movements. Moreover, the role of the external intervention was limited to the transnational
networks of the Zapatista movement and did not involve wide array of foreign actors like the other
two movements. Furthermore, the states’ reaction towards the three rebel movements were very
variant, despite that the three states have repressed and used violent strategies at least at one phase
of the struggle.
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The process tracing and the brief analysis helped in conducting my in-depth analysis in Chapter 4.
This in-depth analysis showed that my interactive model and the variables are of relevance. Not
only that, but it pointed out through the Zapatista case that the level of democracy seems to be not
only an antecedent variable but might be more significant than the other two variables. This is
because the level of democracy influenced first the state’s reaction towards the rebel movement’s
eruption and later to the movement’s transnational networks and popular support. This does not
mean that it is a sufficient variable but rather a necessary one and of higher significance to the
other two variables. Moreover, it demonstrated that transnationalism and popular support is also
a necessary variable that affects the balance of power in favor of the rebel movement, if there are
not any early external interventions. This is because the external intervention influences the
dynamics of the conflict through triggering counter intervention and by then the level of resolve.
It prolongs the armed conflict and reduce the probability of making concessions by any of the
conflicting parties. In other words, external intervention negatively affects the prospects of the
rebel movement either through prolonging the conflict or through freezing it, and according to my
measure of success, which is territorial autonomy, this is considered a failure.
Therefore, the three variables are not considered sufficient ones, but rather necessary ones that
interact to yield the intended outcomes. In other words, the causal mechanism cannot be explained
in 3x3 table, because the three variables should exist together in the particular sequence and
configuration discussed above. It is also important to outline that besides that the level of
democracy might be an antecedent variable, it seems to be endogenous to the whole process. It did
not only affect the outcomes of the movements but got affected by the movements as well. In short,
the three case studies endorsed my proposition that the causal mechanism to my research question
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is explained through an interactive model of three variables that exist and interact in a particular
configuration and sequence.
In all, I think that the thesis’s main contribution is to show that the causal mechanism to explain
the research question should transcend the narrow-scoped theoretical approaches existing in the
literature. It is not about the existing of variables but the configuration and sequence of such
variables. The case studies did not only endorse such assumption and my theoretical interactive
model, but they also demonstrated that the level of democracy within the state might be an
antecedent and a more significant variable than the others. This may need to be further studied and
examined yet the thesis should be considered as a hypothesis-generating research. Thus, the thesis
showed that displaying the variables in the 3x3 table might act as a limitation to accurately explain
the causal mechanism.
This thesis has also highlighted that the democracy variable might not only affect the outcomes of
the rebel movements but be antecedent to the other two variable and an endogenous to the whole
process.

Moreover, the cases showed that the relationship of political violence and

democratization was not crucial to affect the dynamics of the conflicts. However, this might need
further research, usage of other methodological tools and engagement of more cases to prove this
proposition’s relevance.
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